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Abstract
According to German legal scholar, Claus Roxin, German prosecutors
are the "most objective civil servants" in the world. Roxin 's assessment of
German prosecution practice reflects the conviction of many German legal
scholars that prosecutors in Germany's inquisitorial system function as
second judges dedicated to finding the objective "truth." In this Article I
investigate how prosecutors "translate" the normative duty of objectivity
enshrined in the German penal code into observable practices on the
ground I examine prosecutorial decision-making in three sexual assault
trials. Sexual assault cases pose unique challenges to prosecutors as well
as to the definition of objectivity. Because the crime typically occurs in
private, the search for truth often focuses on the testimonies of the victim
and the suspect. In cases in which the physical evidence is inconclusive
and the defendant claims that the victim consented, the focus of the fact
finder's inquiry is often directed at the victim 's credibility.
Drawing on transcript and interview data, I propose three models of
'faces" of prosecutorial "objectivity." Surprisingly, despite the fact that
judges structure the presentation of evidence in German trials, prosecutors
play a critical role in "interpreting" the facts presented at trial. In each of
the cases examined in this Article, the face of objectivity is constructed
through a relational process that unfolds between the presiding judge and
the trial prosecutor. Although many legal scholars maintain that penal
code sharply circumscribes prosecutorial discretion in major crime cases
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in Germany, my research demonstrates that a wide variation exists in the
way that individual prosecutors interpret their duty to view the evidence
objectively.
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"The score may be the same but if the instruments and players are not,
the legal music will sound differently."'
I. Introduction
According to rules of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, a
German prosecutor does not function as a party but rather as a "second
judge" who makes decisions based on the law and facts.2 A German
1. Harry T. Edwards, Comments on Mirjan Damafka 's Of Evidentiary Transplants,
45 Am~. J. Comp. L. 853, 853 (1997).
2. See Joachim Herrmann, The German Prosecutor, in DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN
EuROPE AND AmERICA 16, 18 (Kenneth Gulp Davis ed., 1976) (explaining that the German
prosecutor is "limited to the judicial task of applying the provisions of the Penal Code to the
1288
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prosecutor does not function from the standpoint of a party, but from a
neutral, detached, and objective perspective.3 Although adversarial
criminal justice systems presume that the "truth" will emerge from a battle
between opposing parties, in Germany's inquisitorial system, in theory, the
"truth" is the end result of a process that begins with an objective
investigation supervised by the prosecutor and continues through to the
presentation of the evidence at a main proceeding that is overseen by a
judge or a judicial panel.4
This normative vision of prosecutors' dedication to truth is perpetuated
in law schools where legal scholars educating new generations of lawyers
repeat Roxin's maxim that German prosecutors are "the most objective civil
servants in the world."5  Roxin's assessment of German prosecution
practice reflects the conviction of many German legal scholars that
prosecutors in Germany's inquisitorial system function as second judges
dedicated to finding the objective "truth."0 German criminal procedure law
attempts to mandate prosecutorial objectivity by requiring prosecutors to
engage in certain activities such as investigating the facts for and against
the suspect, summarizing the evidence for and against the accused during
the main procedural hearing, and permitting prosecutors to file an appeal on
behalf of a defendant when the prosecutor believes that the defendant either
is not guilty or that the sentence imposed by the court is too harsh.7
Instilled with the vision to serve as "guardians of the law,"0 German
facts of each case," essentially making the prosecutor a judge-like figure).
3. See id. (describing how the German prosecutor is not an administrator trying to
attain practical goals, but instead acts objectively in applying the provisions of the Penal
Code to the facts of each case).
4. See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining How the Germans Do It,
78 MICH. L. REv. 204, 206-12 (1979) (describing the German way of trial as an effective
truth-seeking framework).
5. Claus Roxin, Zur Rechtstellung der Staatsanwaltschaft Damals und Heute, 3 DRIZ
109, 113 (1997).
6. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how a German
prosecutor acts as a "second judge").
7. See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNCI [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7,
1987, BUNDESGESETZBLATr, Tiel I [BGBL. 1], § 296 (Ger.) [hereinafter STPO] (Stating that
both prosecution and defense counsel may file appeals on behalf of the accused).
8. See "Waldenburg" Training Materials (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) (stating that German prosecutors do not function as parties but they possess a duty
to be objective and to ensure that justice is administered according to the law). Note: From
2004 through 2008, the author conducted field research in fourteen different prosecution
offices in Germany. To protect the anonymity of the interviewees, fictitious place names
and a numerical coding system have been used to identify' documents and interviewees.
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prosecutors lack the thirst for winning that their American colleagues
display in the courtroom.9 As the chief of the investigation process,
prosecutors function not as invested parties, but rather as objective truth-
finders who are obliged to investigate the facts that weigh both in favor of,
as well as against, a suspect's guilt.10
For decades, scholarship that described prosecutorial practice in
Germany contended that the normative ideal of objective decision-making
definitively shaped prosecutorial practice. In 1979, German legal scholar
Klaus Sessar asserted that prosecutors' attention to the law, rather than
pragmatic concerns about costs and efficiency, guided decisions to
prosecute."1 In a seminal article published in 1979, John Langbein boldly
declared that Germany was the "Land Without Plea Bargaining."1
Undoubtedly, part of this optimism in the law's efficacy stemmed from the
civil law tradition's dogmatic belief that law was a science that could be
applied methodically without political influence or interpretation. 1
9. Because German prosecutors do not bear the burden of proof at trial, their role at
trial is admittedly different than their American counterparts. See Langbein, supra note 4, at
208 ("Nonadversarial procedure recognizes no party burdens of proof. German law adheres
to a standard of proof not materially different from our beyond-reasonable-doubt; but
without the system of adversary presentation of evidence, there is no occasion to think of the
'prosecution case' ..... The only burden is the court's.") In addition, the extent to which the
nature of the adversarial system has shaped the trial practices of American prosecutors is
open to debate. See WILLIAM T. Pizzi, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF
CRIMINAL TRIAL HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED To Do To
REBUILD IT 13 1-34 (1999) (showing how the American system values winning over truth-
seeking). However, several prominent scholars have described American prosecutors as
having this thirst when comparing them to their counterparts on the European continent.
See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAw 83
(2001) (noting that American trials are much more susceptible to variability in the intensity
of adversarial advocacy); Pizzi, supra, at 118 (proposing that the American criminal
adjudication system is much more adversarial than other continental systems in that it
encourages excesses of advocacy).
10. See STPO, supra note 7, § 160(2) (requiring the public prosecution office to reveal
not only incriminating, but also exonerating, evidence). In addition, prosecutors possess the
power to petition the court for an acquittal at the conclusion of a trial if they are not
convinced that the evidence is legally sufficient to meet the standard of guilt; a prosecutor
may also file an appeal on behalf of the accused. See id § 296(2) (stating that the public
prosecution office may also file an appeal for the benefit of the accused).
11. See Klaus Sessar, Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR 255,
255 (William F. McDonald ed., 1979) (stating that German prosecutors are more concerned
with principles of law than with a pragmatic system that focuses on what can and cannot
feasibly be prosecuted).
12. See Langbein, supra note 4, at 204-05 (discussing Germany's deliberate efforts to
eliminate plea bargaining from criminal procedure).
13. Certainly, the development of the German concept of Rechtstaat or constitution-
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Nevertheless, the sanguinity of German scholars regarding the ideals and
orientation of the criminal justice system'14 led reformers in Italy, Spain,
South Korea, Latin America, and Japan to look to the German model for
inspiration.'15 The reputation of the German system did not escape notice by
American scholars. For several decades, American scholars, seeking an
antidote to the level of prosecutorial discretion and deal-making in the
United States, praised the German model because it inculcated prosecutors
with a truth-seeking lens and appeared to successfuilly limit prosecutorial
discretion through the system's commitment to the bedrock principle of
mandatory prosecution.'16 That principle, which requires prosecutors to file
charges in all cases in which sufficient evidence exists to believe that a
crime has been committed, aims to ensure that prosecutors enforce the law
in a uniform and nonarbitrary manner. 
17
based state and the concomitant desire to break with the destructive legacy of National
Socialism also influenced the development of Germany's post-war legal scholarship. See
Peter Graf Kielmansegg, The Basic Law-Response to the Past or Design for the Future?, in
FORTY YEARS OF THE GRUNDGESETZ 5, 6 (Ger. Historical Inst. ed., 1990), available at
http://www.ghi-dc.org/publications/ghipubs/op/opOl .pdf ("There is general agreement that
the Basic Law first and foremost is a reactive constitution. The past that had shaped the
political outlook of the founding fathers and mothers had two faces: an ill-functioning,
weak, and helpless democracy on the one hand and a cruel despotism on the other.").
14. This recognition extends to the theoretical structure of German criminal law,
which Markus Dubber has described as "unparalleled in comprehensiveness and
complexity." Markus Dirk Dubber, The Promise of German Criminal Law: A Science of
Crime and Punishment, 6 GERM. L.J. 1049, 1051 (2005), available at http://www.german
lawjoumnal.com/pdfsNolO6NoO7fPDF_-Vol_-06_-No_-07_-1049-1073_Articles Dubber.pdf.
15. See id at 1054 ("As criminal law scientists, German professors traditionally have
enjoyed significant influence on the doctrine of criminal law. .. ."); Yue Ma, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Plea Bargaining in the United States, France, Germany and Italy: A
Comparative Perspective, 12 INT'L GRIM. JUST. REv. 22, 30-48 (2002) (describing the
similarities between the continental systems' curbing prosecutorial discretion, as compared
to the American system).
16. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 4, at 210-12 (explaining that the German system of
compulsory prosecution does not alleviate the court of its truth-seeking duty even in the face
of a guilty plea); see also KAGAN, supra note 9, at 232 ("[Tjhe need for intensely adversarial
legal challenges would decline .. , if the United States emulated the more centralized
judiciaries and prosecutorial organizations of European countries, with their .. . higher level
of legal uniformity.").
17. See NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 214 (1996) ("The state
attorney has a duty to prosecute offences under § 152 11. Where the decision not to
investigate is taken, the victim has the right under § 172 et seq. to require the state attorney
to investigate."); see also STPO, supra note 7, § 152(2) (stating the prosecutor's obligation,
absent contrary law, to take action with regard to all prosecutable criminal offenses); id.
§ 172 (describing how individuals may compel the bringing of public charges).
291
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More recently, the rising influence of legal scholarship that challenges
the extent of the law's prescriptive force, coupled with changes in German
prosecution practice, have raised the question of whether the prescriptive
mandates that set forth the theory of prosecution practice actually shape
practice on the ground.'18 The extent to which German prosecution practice
actually reflects the normative vision of objective fact-finding is an
intriguing question. It is evident that, under the pressure of resource
constraints, modem prosecution practice cannot meet the demands of the
resource-intensive truth-finding process originally envisioned by
Germany's post-war Code of Criminal Procedure.' 9 Most notably, during
the past four decades, the increasing pressure of resource constraints have
forced legislators to carve out ever larger exceptions to the principle of
mandatory prosecution20 and to grant prosecutors greater discretion in
handling minor crimes cases. 
2'
The development that has caused the greatest consternation among
German legal scholars has been the growth of case settlement practices that
were not formally sanctioned by statute but rather developed outside the
boundaries of the formal law.2 While the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) acknowledged that the practice of negotiated
settlements was not per se unconstitutional in 1987,2 it was not until 2009
18. See, e.g., Thomas Weigend, The Decay of the Inquisitorial Ideal: Plea Bargaining
Invades German Criminal Procedure, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 39, 44 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008) ("[T]he
times of fuill-scale trials for each case are long past. Today, a substantial part of criminal
cases ... are no longer resolved by tral ... but on the basis of negotiations .. . .)
19. See STPO, supra note 7, § 244 (establishing a process that culminates in a fuill
presentation of evidence in a court proceeding); see also id. §§ 249, 252-60 (requiring that
all of the evidence be presented orally in court).
20. See id. § 153(l) (granting prosecutors discretion to dismiss petty offenses without
court approval if the minimum penalty is not subject to increase and the consequences
ensuing from the offense are minimal).
2 1. See Sessar, supra note 11, at 256 (emphasizing Germany's efforts to eliminate
prosecutors' discretion to prosecute through legislative definitions of what crimes should be
punished); see also infra note 27 and accompanying text (listing ways in which prosecutors
can use discretion to avoid bringing charges for petty offenses).
22. See Stephen C. Thaman, Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating Confessions and
Consensual Resolution of Criminal Cases, 11 ELECTRONIC J1. Comp. L. 1, 43-44 (2007),
available at http://www.ejcl.org/l13/articlel 13-34.pdf (tracing the evolution of plea-
bargaining practices in Germany).
23. See Antonio K. Esposito & Christoph J.M. Safferling, Report-Recent Case Law
of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) in Strafachen (Criminal Law), 9 GER.
L.J. 683, 702 n.68 (2008), available at http://www.germanlawAjournal.com/pdfs/Vol09No05/
PDF-vol_09_No_05_683-710_Developments Safferlling.pdf (stating that a 1987 decision
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that the legislature finally sanctioned the widespread practice.2 The course
of this practice-inspired change in the Code of Criminal Procedure ran
sharply counter to the civil law tradition's circumscribed vision of the
judicial role as well as the positivist vision of the nature of law itself.
25
These changes have prompted scholars to resoundingly criticize the
growing gap between the inquisitorial ideal of a thorough fact finding and
adjudication process and actual prosecution practice which has increasingly
relied on practices that short-circuit. that process.2 In particular, scholars
have criticized the growing ambit of prosecutorial discretion and the rise of
negotiated settlements in so-called "minor" crime cases.2 While there has
always been some spielraum or wiggle room in the charging process, the
increasing use of settlement agreements has critically weakened the
prescriptive force of the principle of mandatory prosecution.2 During my
interviews with judicial officials, several judges at the appellate level, who
do not face the same day-to-day workload pressures as prosecutors and trial
court judges, joined in this criticism of prosecutorial practice.2 In
of the Federal Constitutional Court held that plea-bargaining is basically not unlawful). In
1997, the Bundesgerichtshof, which is the highest court of appeals for criminal cases that do
not involve constitutional issues, held that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
explicitly forbid sentencing agreements between the court and the parties.
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 28, 1997, NFIJE JURISTISCI{E
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 43 (195), 1997 (Ger.).
24. See STPO, supra note 7, § 257c (laying out procedures, involving a confession by
the accused, that would determine the outcome by agreement between the defendant, the
prosecutor, and the court).
25. See Weigend, supra note 18, at 64 ("liTlhe practice of negotiating for justice does
not have a basis in law ... or in procedural principle. Its basis is expediency only. ... "..).
26. See, e.g., id. at 39 (calling the change in Germany's criminal procedure a "decay of
the inquisitorial ideal").
27. Volker Erb, Absprachen im Strafverfiahren als Quelle unbeherrschbarer Risiken
firi den Rechtstaat, in REcHT DER WIRTSCHAFT UND DER ARBEIT iN EUROPA:
GEDACHTNICHSSCHRIFT FOR WOLFGANG LoMEYER 743, 743-58 (2004). Prosecutors now
possess greater discretion in disposing of petty offenses without court action. See STPO,
supra note 7, § 153 (describing situations when crimes of a minor nature may not be
prosecuted, at the prosecutor's discretion). In cases involving less serious offenses,
prosecutors, with the court's consent, may provisionally terminate proceedings subject to the
condition that the defendant pays damages, makes a donation to a nonprofit organization, or
performs other conditions. See id § 153a (enumerating conditions that may be imposed
instead of public prosecution).
28. See Weigend, supra note 18, at 54-56 (describing how settlement agreements in
German criminal procedure undermine various protections previously afforded by the
principle of mandatory prosecution).
29. See Interview with Appellate Judge-22FE (confidential interview) (July 22, 2004)
(describing how more and more cases are ended by plea bargaining) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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particular, one appellate judge accused prosecutors of having adopted an "in
and out box" mentality that privileges efficient file processing and case
closing strategies at the expense of conducting an extensive investigation
designed to discover the truth.3 In the words of another appellate judge,
"in the majority of low-level crime cases, prosecutors do the work of
administration and not of justice-they get their papers signed and that is
that."'3'
While scholars from systems that follow a common law tradition
might be tempted to celebrate the demise of a system that was formally
known as the "land without plea bargaining," the mandates established by
law on the books in Germany have always set a standard that was primarily
normative, if not mythological, in character.3 Even the prescriptive force
of those norms have weakened in inquisitorial systems, while the
adversarial vision of truth finding itself has fallen far short of its own truth-
finding aspirations. There is extensive scholarship in the United States that
criticizes prosecutors for abandoning their truth-seeking duties. William
Pizzi, who derisively criticized the American system for producing "trials
without truth," has alleged that a "conviction mentality" motivates
prosecutors to privilege securing convictions over achieving justice.3
Given that roughly 90% of cases are resolved through the use of plea
bargains rather than trials, the vision of justice being settled by a jury of
one's peers is one achieved more on television screens than in real life.3
Struggling with high case loads and few resources, many public defenders
lack the time and resources to mount a defense that might dislodge the
coercive leverage that the state possesses in the plea negotiation process.
30. See id ("If this would be my room, you would find furniture over there. .... On
one side you would find the remark 'entrance' and on the other side 'exit.' And this is the
perspective of a good public prosecutor. That what is coming in now today has to be
finished.").
31. Interview with Appellate Judge-i 3M (confidential interview) (Apr. 10, 2004)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. Thomas Weigend, Remarks at the Washington and Lee Law Review Symposium,
Prosecutorial Power: A Transnational Workshop (Apr. 2, 2010).
33. See Pizzi, supra note 9, at 221 ("A strong trial system has to place a high priority
on truth .... Our trial system does not do this and, as a result, our trials lack focus.").
34. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CIM. L.
REV. 50, 50 (1968) ("Today, roughly ninety per cent of all defendants convicted of crime in
both state and federal courts plead guilty . . .. )
35. See, e.g., id. at 100 (describing how in Cleveland, Ohio, prosecutors and judges
facilitate overcharging to coerce defendants into pleading guilty); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1985 (1992) (noting that innocent
defendants can be coerced to plead guilty to avoid the risk of a hefty sentence).
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The nature of the challenges facing both criminal justice systems
underscores the critical role that prosecutors play in the "truth-finding"
process. Thus, despite the fact that prosecutorial discretion in Germany has
increased and that the principle of mandatory prosecution has lost much of
its force,3 it is worthwhile to examine what it means for prosecutors to
function obj.ectively in a system where success is not measured in terms of
trial victories. Understanding German prosecution may further our
understanding of the prosecutorial function, insofar as German prosecutors
seek to honor their normative mandate to investigate and prosecute cases
through a lens of objectivity. To the extent that prosecutors are not driven
by political considerations or the desire to win, it is important to understand
what factors shape the evidence-gathering and prosecution processes, as
well as how those factors shape criminal justice outcomes.
Despite these criticisms, many of the core features and underlying
normative assumptions of Germany's inquisitorial criminal justice system
remain in place.3 While it is true that the pressure of high caseloads and
limited resources have encouraged prosecutors and courts to pursue
negotiated settlements in many minor crime cases, statutory restrictions ban
the use of "confession agreements" in major crime cases.3" Charges in
cases involving premeditated murder, for example, may not be negotiated
downwards as they may be in the United States .39 Given these restrictions,
it is worth examining whether or how German prosecutors interpret their
duty to function objectively and translate that duty into trial practice.4
36. German scholars, in particular, have criticized the extent to which the German
criminal justice system has deviated from the coveted principle of mandatory prosecution.
See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in
Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 272-76
(1977) (describing various ways in which the principle of mandatory prosecution is not
wholeheartedly implemented); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal
Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1569 (1977) (acknowledging that
summary procedures have been used to dispose of a large number of cases in France and
Germany).
37. See Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 36, at 1563 (combating critics of the German
mandatory prosecution rule for not pointing to a case that shows the impotence of the rule).
38. See STPO, supra note 7, § 153 (allowing prosecutors discretion only with regard to
petty crimes). Admittedly the list of crimes included in the German category of "minor
crimes" is an expansive one that includes some crimes that are considered to be felonies in
the United States. See, e.g., Weigend, supra note 18, at 47 (suggesting that in Germany the
crime of extortion may be mitigated to a lower sentence in plea bargaining).
39. See Interview with Appellate Judge-22FE, supra note 29 (noting that there is an
absolute punishment of fifteen years imprisonment for murder, which may not be bargained
down).
40. Given the differences in the procedural posture of adjudicatory hearings in
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While recent critics have derided the use of confession agreements to short-
circuit the truth finding process,4' it may be short-sighted to conclude that
the use of those agreements has undermined prosecutors' commitment to
objectivity in major crimes cases. More specifically, the simple rise in the
numbers of confession agreements tells us little about the stance that
prosecutors take in the court room and whether and how their daily
decision-making reflects a commitment to viewing the evidence from an
objective standpoint.4
While prior research studies of the German prosecution function have
emphasized how bureaucratic organizational practices have shaped the
prosecutorial behavior during the case investigation stage, those studies
shed little light on prosecutorial decision-making in the courtroom. 43  In
particular, the bulk of the research that explores prosecutorial decision-
making processes focuses on the mass processing of low-level crime cases
where case-closing strategies are said to reflect bureaucratically constituted
decision practices."4 This research argues that bureaucratic practices
undermine prosecutors' application of the principle of legality, as
prosecutors, besieged with a crushing case load, must adopt efficient
strategies to close cases.4 While this research has broken important
ground, it not only fails to explain what happens in the courtroom, but it
also ignores prosecutorial practice in major crime cases.
This Article explores that gap. In particular, I examine the decisions
that prosecutors make in the courtroom and argue that how prosecutors both
view and perform their duty to function as second judges impacts the
outcome of the truth-finding process. Using data gathered from interviews
and participant observation studies, I show how consensual decision-
Germany, I refer to these hearings as 'main proceedings," which is a rough translation of the
German term for those hearings, throughout the rest of this Article.
41. See Weigend, supra note 18, at 54 (describing how a proposed draft of
Section 257c of the STPO would allow the court to consider procedural conduct-namely,
whether to accused confessed-when determining the sentence).
42. See id at 47-53 (describing the origins and growth of the practice of plea
bargaining in German criminal trials).
43. See Hans-Joachim Asmus, Der Staatsanwalt-ein biierokratischer Faktor in der
Verbrechenskontrolle?, 17 ZErrscHRiFT FOR SOZIOLOGIE 117, 117-31 (1988) (describing the
bureaucratic elements of prosecution practice).
44. See id at 118 (describing several studies that argue that prosecutors' relationships
are bureaucratically motivated).
45. See E. BLANKENBURG ET AL., DiE STAATSANWALTSCHAFTr LM PROzM
STRAFRECHLICHFR SOzIKONTROLLE 313-19 (1978) (arguing that the prosecution service
performs a case settlement function that reflects pragmatic considerations).
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making norms often deterninatively shape both the nature and rigor of the
truth-finding process. The bulk of the article traces and analyzes the role
played by prosecutors in three sexual assault trials. By closely examining
decision-making at trial, I show how prosecutors translate their duty to view
the evidence objectively into a myriad of observable courtroom practices.
46
Rape cases offer us a unique lens through which to view the nature of
objectivity. Prosecutors in both adversarial and inquisitorial systems play a
gate-keeping role .47  Through their discretionary decision-making,
prosecutors determine what claims will proceed to trial.4 In the context of
rape cases, that role is particularly contested. The trajectory of a rape case
is strongly shaped by the prosecutor's appraisal of witness credibility.4
Because the crime of rape typically occurs in private, the search for truth
often focuses on the testimony of the victim and the suspect.50 In cases in
which the physical evidence is inconclusive, a prosecutor's assessment of
witness credibility is often dispositive. 5'
In the United States, a large percentage of reported rape cases never
reaches the trial stage.5 Many victims of rape never report the crime out of
fear of being stigmatized by the "fact-finding" process and facing hostility
from the police, prosecutors, and juries.5 Prosecutors are often reluctant to
46. 1 observed these trials during an extended period of field research conducted in
Germany between 2005 and 2008. 1 supplement discussion of those cases with material
drawn from my interviews of over one hundred prosecutors, as well as fifty interviews with
judges, defense attorneys, and ministry officials conducted during that same period.
47. See Herrmann, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that German prosecutors can decide
when to bring a charge by deciding whether or not there is sufficient evidence for a
conviction and contrasting American prosecutors' wide discretion to bring cases to the
relatively strict restraints on discretion in the German criminal system).
48. See id at 23-28 (describing circumstances in which prosecutors may exercise
discretion to not pursue charges).
49. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 19 (1988) (noting that the factors in whether a
prosecutor dismisses or downgrades a rape case are whether the prosecutor finds the victim's
testimony plausible and whether her account can be corroborated).
50. See id. at 43 (stating that a major impediment to the disposition of rape cases is a
fundamental distrust of the victim which in turn makes corroboration of testimony difficult).
51. See id. at 42 ("[T]he absence of corroborating evidence was most critical where the
case turned on questions of attitude ... or where the woman's story was considered
incredible or inculpatory.").
52. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
Cir. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1210-12 (1997) (noting the "striking" rape case attrition
rates may be a product of "institutionalized sexism" and the "judgmental policies" of police
and prosecutors, but arguing that victims' decisions not to prosecute and the criminal justice
system's screening of faulty cases are among other diverse factors at work).
53. See ESTRICH, supra note 49, at 1-5 (describing common deterrents faced by rape
victims in the U.S., including reluctant police and prosecutors, heightened evidence
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file charges in rape cases and even less likely to bring those cases to trial
unless there is a high certainty that a jury will return a guilty verdict.54
Those cases that do proceed to trial may be motivated by political reasons."'
In the absence of compelling physical evidence, rape cases may be difficult
to prosecute given that the crime often occurs in private and the issue of
consent is often contested. 
5 6
At first blush, one might expect that German prosecutors, who do not
view their role in adversarial terms, would be less gun-shy about filing rape
cases than their American counterparts. The fact that professional judges,
rather than lay juries, dominate the fact-finding process would seem to
make the process less intimidating for victims.57 Moreover, rape victims in
German courts need not struggle to conform their testimony to the strict
evidentiary guidelines that bind testimony given in American courts.
58
Witnesses in German courts may speak in a narrative form, which would be
considered unresponsive in American courtrooms.5 9 Additionally, because
German law allows victims the right to be represented by a collateral
standards in certain jurisdictions, and juries' knee-jerk suspicions of victim complicity).
54. See id. at 8-9 (characterizing one prosecutor's refusal to prosecute an acquaintance
rape as a typical prosecutorial response to rape scenarios not guaranteed of a conviction).
55. One need look no further than the recent "Duke Lacrosse scandal" for evidence
that prosecutors, motivated by potential political gain, have deviated from their truth-finding
missions. See, e.g., Lenese Herbert, Prosecutorial Discretion Meets Disaster Capitalism, in
RACE TO INJUSTICE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 211, 226
(Michael L. Seigel ed., 2009) (characterizing prosecutor Mike Nifong as a "disaster
capitalist" who abused prosecutorial discretion for short-lived political gain). The structure
of the German system also suggests that the hurdles to convictions in rape cases might be
less significant.
56. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 52, at 1316-17 (noting the government's
burden of proving nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt, often in sole reliance on the
victim's uncorroborated testimony, is the "essential practical difficulty" in prosecuting
acquaintance rape-by far the most common form of rape).
57. See id. at 1196 ("[T]he [American] system puts the victim rather than the
defendant on trial. Juries, motivated by the same biases as other participants in the system,
often blame the victim and acquit the defendant.").
58. See William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37, 42-43 (1996)
(arguing German courts' preference for narrative testimony arises from the civil law notion
that "relevant evidence should be obtained in as near to its original form as possible," as well
as a systemnic optimism that "factflnders will be able to separate the more probative from the
irrelevant evidence").
59. See id ("[Ilt is not unusual for a witness at a German criminal trial to mention
something that would bring an immediate objection in an American courtroom-perhaps
because it is hearsay, contains an opinion, or is not directly relevant. . ., and may even be
prejudicial to the defendant.").
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prosecutor (Nebenklager) at trial, one would expect that victims' rights
would be more protected than in a system in which no lawyer is appointed
to protect the victim's specific interests .6 0  Given these procedural
differences, one would expect German courtrooms to be friendlier to rape
victims and, as a result, victims to be more willing to report the crime and
cooperate in the prosecution.
Thought experiments do not tell us how German prosecutors wrestle
with conflicting evidence and assess witness credibility in the
courtroom.6 Key questions remain. How do German prosecutors
translate their duty to be objective in rape cases that go to trial? Do they
ask the court to acquit a suspect when they doubt the victim's credibility?
By examining prosecutorial decision-making during rape trials, we
can understand more fully how German prosecutors interpret their duty to
view the evidence objectively and how their function as a "second judge"
shapes their decision-making at trial. Moreover, by examining
prosecutorial decision-making in cases in which the credibility of the
victim, witnesses, and defendant is extremely contested, we are afforded a
unique window into the truth-finding role of a German prosecutor. It is
my contention that, in cases in which the facts are particularly uncertain,
consensual decision-making norms between prosecutors and judges drive
prosecutorial behavior.
German legal scholarship of the twentieth century postulated that
prosecutors would function as second judges who weigh case facts like
detached legal scientists.6 In this Article, I challenge that idealized
picture of technocratic decision-making. I argue that prosecutors possess
wide flexibility at trial in applying "objective" legal standards and
60. See id. at 59 (observing how the Nebenkla'ge system's unique advantages have led
to widespread participation, in allowing sexual assault victims to enjoy a level of
involvement commensurate with their personal stake in the proceeding).
61. While there can be numerous problems with comparing statistics from different
criminal justice systems, a recent study, funded by the European Commission's Daphne 11
Programme, found that German conviction rates for rape in 2006 ranked in the mid-range of
European countries. See Jo LovEr-r & Liz KELLY, DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, SIMILAR
OUTCOMES?: TRACKING ATrRITIoN IN REPORTED RAPE CASES THROUGHOUT EUROPE 21
(2009), http://cwasu.org/publication display.asp?pageid=PAPERS&type=l &pagekey=44&
year-=2009 (last visited Oct. 27, 2010) (ranking Germany's rape conviction rate near the
bottom of the group of European countries, with a "mid-range' conviction designation) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See, e.g., Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting
Attorney in West Germany, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 508, 516 (1970) (characterizing the office of
the German prosecutor as a "judicial agency" with "restricted power limited to particular
situations").
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determining what constitutes justice. While the law may play a role in
creating courtroom procedures that produce a commitment to prosecutorial
objectivity at a ritual-like level, I argue that the degree of an individual
prosecutor's commitment to the performance of objectivity is shaped by
institutional and individual-level factors. The face of objectivity is
constructed through a series of work practices that begins with the
investigation of a complaint and proceeds to the end of the appellate stage.
Because a prosecutor makes decisions and undertakes actions while
embedded in an organization, a prosecutor's ability to function in an
objective manner is driven not only by the individual's mindset, but perhaps
more importantly by organizational norms, practices, resources, and inter-
institutional relationships.
In Part 1, 1 introduce the reader to the basic function and structure of
the German prosecution service. In Part 11, 1 discuss the importance of the
prosecutor's relationship with the presiding judge in the main proceeding
and suggest three different stances that prosecutors may take during the
main proceeding vis-A-vis the presiding judge. Drawing on interview data
and participant observation studies of German prosecutors, I argue that any
prosecutor's definition of objectivity is constructed through his or her own
daily decision-making practices and is "situationally contingent." In Part
111, I draw on participant-observation studies of three different main
proceedings to show how these different relational stances between the
prosecutor and the court shape the construction of objectivity. Finally, in
the paper's conclusion, I argue that, while the law creates and partially
defines the duty of objectivity, prosecutors interpret and enact the full
meaning of objectivity through their daily decision-making.
1. The German Prosecution Function
A. Institutional Position and Role
The mindset that German prosecutors bring to their decision-making is
a product of the criminal justice system's institutional structure, the
designated function that prosecutors perform within that structure, and the
key statutory precepts that seek to guide their decision-making. The
original conception of the prosecution service that developed in the mid-
nineteenth century envisioned that prosecutors would supervise the
investigation process and serve as "second judges" during the criminal
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proceedings. The liberal reformers who created the Prussian prosecution
service believed that by transferring responsibility for the investigation
process to the prosecution service, this two-judge structure would diminish
the conviction mentality that judges and the police acquired during the
investigation.64 This institutional change mirrored other changes
throughout Europe which transformed the search for truth from "unilateral
inquiries into a sort of collective enterprise., 65  Thus, although German
prosecutors' primary functions are to supervise the investigation process
and determine whether criminal charges should be initiated, from a systems
perspective, their role is to enhance the "neutrality of the official search for
truth."t66
Despite the apparent similarities between the prosecutorial charging
function in the two systems, key provisions in the German Code of
Criminal Procedure define the prosecution's intentionally "judicial"-rather
than "adversarial"-character and attempt to prescribe standards of conduct
that aim to shield prosecutorial decision-making from political influence.6
63. See John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 439, 449 (1974) (noting the German prosecutor's functions were extracted from
the former duties of the "all-powerful" Prussian inquisitorial judge and therefore retained a
"continuing judicial character").
64. See Peter Colin, Die Geburt der Staatsanwaltschaft in Preu/3en, FORUM
HISTORIAE IURIS, Mar. 12, 200 1, at M 23-24, http://www.forhistiur.de/index-en.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2010) (describing the concerns of liberal reformers about judicial
investigations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. Elisabetta Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on Systemic Difference
and the Search for the Truth, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 145, 154 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008).
66. Id.
67. Chief among the provisions designed to limit discretion is the famous "legality
principle" (Legalititsprinzip), often referred to as the "principle of mandatory prosecution.'
This principle, which requires that prosecutors file charges in all cases in which sufficient
evidence exists to indicate guilt, has been the bedrock of German prosecutorial practice.
Leading legal reformists of the late nineteenth century believed that adopting the principle
would help prevent the state from interfering in the administration of justice by binding
decision-makers to following codified precepts. See Mirjan Dama~ka, The Reality of
Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a German Monograph, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 119,
125 (1981) (attributing the principle's emergence to a "liberal ideology" that championed set
prosecutorial guidelines as an antidote to inappropriate charging decisions). The inclusion
of the principle of legality in the Code came in response to the Prussian experience with a
prosecution corps that had exploited its freedom to define which cases should be prosecuted
on public interest grounds by leveling charges against the regime's political opponents. See
id. (noting the significance of mistrust in the prosecutors' offices during the "turbulent years
of 1848-1849"). Consistent with Germany's civil law tradition, lawmakers viewed the
charging decision as the logical conclusion of a decision-making process in which a legal
scientist classified facts within the correct legal categories. See id. (describing the
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Consistent with their normative role as guardians of the law, the chief
obligation of prosecutors is to ensure that the investigation process is
conducted fairly.6 To this end, prosecutors are charged with the
responsibility to gather both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence against a
suspect during the investigation phase of a proceeding.69 As Dr. Jescheck
stated, "[T]he prosecutor is placed in a position which obligates him as
much to protect the accused as to come forward against him."00 After an
investigation is complete, prosecutors send the investigation file to the court
to determine whether enough evidence exists to open a main proceeding.'
Like their American counterparts, German prosecutors possess a monopoly
72
over the criminal charging function.
Consistent with their function as "second judges," prosecutors do not
present a case against the defendant during the main proceeding.7" Unlike
an adversary proceeding, in which prosecutors bear the evidentiary burden
of presenting evidence against the accused, in a German courtroom, the
presiding judge bears the responsibility of conducting the hearing,
examining the defendant, and taking evidence.7 If the court decides that
reformers' belief that "charging decisions ... should never be grounded on equitable or
policy reasons, but remain solely a matter of legal sufficiency"). The criminal process itself
was viewed as a "decision involving correct subsumption under legal categories." Id. at 125.
68. See Jescheck, supra note 62, at 510-11 ("The prosecutor as guardian of the law
should be empowered to operate from the beginning in the proceedings against the accused
in such a manner that the law is satisfied in all ways." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. See STPO, supra note 7, § 160 (directing the public prosecution office to consider
incriminating and exculpatory evidence, as well as any other circumstances that might
impact the legal consequences of the act).
70. Jescheck, supra note 62, at 511.
71. See STPO, supra note 7, §§ 199, 200 (requiring the prosecutor to submit to the
competent court, along with his application to open main proceedings, the investigation file
and a bill of indictment identifying the charges, the relevant law, the evidence, the witnesses,
and the investigation results).
72. See id. § 152(l) (granting the Staatsanwaltschaft a monopoly over the preferment
of public charges).
73. See id §§ 243, 244 (stating the prosecutor's responsibility is to read the charges
and the legal assessment on which the application to open a main proceeding was based,
after which the court assumes responsibility for examining the defendant and taking
evidence).
74. See id § 238(1) (outlining the judicial fuinction in the main proceeding). At the
Amatgericht level, a single judge is in charge of the proceedings. See
GERICHTSVERFASS1JNGSGESETZ [GVG] [COURTS CONSTITUTION ACT], Sept. 12, 1950,
BUNDESGESETZBLATr [BGBL.] 1, as amended, § § 24, 25 (Ger.) [hereinafter GVG] (granting
jurisdiction to a single judge at the local Amisgericht level over minor criminal matters).
The Sch~ffengericht level utilizes a panel of one professional and two lay judges. See id.
§§ 28, 29 (providing for the organization of three-judge panels in the local courts to hear
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sufficient evidence exists to hold such a proceeding, it is the court that
controls how to structure the presentation of evidence. When each
witness is called to the stand, the judge or panel of judges will initiate the
questioning and then inquire whether the prosecutor and the defense
attorney have additional questions.7 Consistent with the prosecutor's
obligation to be objective, a prosecutor may present evidence that favors the
accused.7 At the close of the presentation of evidence, the prosecutor will
summarize the evidence for and against the defendant and recommend a
specific disposition given his or her factual and legal appraisal of the case.7
In accord with their duties under the principle of legality, prosecutors are
free to recommend that the court acquit a suspect.7
Under German law, the sentencing hearing is not a separate
proceeding.8 Instead, at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the
cases involving potential sentences of up to four years imprisonment). At the Landgericht
level, there is typically a panel of three professional judges and two lay judges. See id.
§§ 74-76 (establishing the Landgericht criminal division panels and granting jurisdiction
over most serious criminal offences). The judge will read the investigation file compiled by
the prosecution office and use that file to determine whether there is enough evidence to
open a main proceeding. See STPO, supra note 7, § 199 (directing the prosecutor to submit
his dossier for the court's review along with the application for a main proceeding).
75. Although the prosecution service compiles a written case file that includes the
investigation results, the case file itself is not evidence. See STPO, supra note 7, § 250
(requiring any proof of fact based on a witness' observation to be ascertained by the court's
examination of that witness in court); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: GERMANY 67 (1977) ("The effect of SrPO § 250 is to reduce the pretrial dossier
to a subsidiary role."). As a general rule, the court may not rely on the file in reaching its
judgment. See id (observing a primary purpose of this requirement is to insulate the judge
from "prosecutorial bias"). To attain evidentiary status, information must be presented
orally in court. See id (likening this "orality principle" to the hearsay rule in the American
system).
76. See STPO, supra note 7, § 240 (requiring the presiding judge to permit associate
judges, defense counsel, and prosecutors to question any defendant, witness, or expert).
77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting the prosecutor's duty of
objectivity requires him to protect the accused when warranted); see also FOSTER, supra note
17, at 222 ("[TMhe state attorney has a very minor role in the main trial and is bound to seek
justice rather than convictions. As such he is under a duty to raise an objection if the court
commits an error that is detrimental to the accused").
78. See SrPO, supra note 7, § 258(1) (providing for closing arguments by the
prosecutor and defendant); see also RICHTLINIEN FGR DAS STRAFVERFAH-REN UND DAS
BuJPGELDVERGAH-REN [RiSTBV] [IGUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL AND FINE PROCEEDINGS) §§ 138,
139 (describing the procedures that prosecutors should follow when they argue for an
acquittal).
79. C.H. BECK, KARISRUI{ER KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG § 258 n.8
(Rolf Hannich et al. eds., 6th ed. 2008) (noting that a prosecutor must judge the evidence
like ajudge at the close of the trial).
80. See STPO, supra note 7, § 160 (requiring the court to terminate the main hearing
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judge or judges will adjourn to deliberate simultaneously about the verdict
and sentence.8 Perhaps the most striking difference between American and
German prosecution practice is that, in contrast with American practice, the
majority of German prosecutors do not regard convictions as victories and
acquittals as losses.82
B. Organization
Germany's prosecution offices, as well as its court system, are
organized on the state or Ldnder level83 and are subsumed within the state-
level Ministries of Justice. 4 While the Minister of Justice at the state level
by announcing its final judgment following the deliberations).
81. Both prosecutors and defense attorneys may challenge a local court's (Amntgericht
or Schu~ffengericht) factual and legal findings. See id. § 296 (stating both the prosecution
and the accused are entitled to appeal a defendant's conviction and sentence). If the district
court (Landgericht) agrees to hear the appeal, a de novo proceeding occurs. See id § 323,
324 (providing for witnesses to be recalled, defendants re-examined, and new evidence
admitted for consideration). The Amtsgericht level includes two "first instance' venues for
cases involving adults. See GVG, supra note 74, §§ 24, 25 (stating the jurisdiction of the
Amt.sgericht courts over lesser criminal matters). A local criminal judge (Strafrichter) sitting
alone can hear cases involving a possible criminal sanction of up to two years imprisonment.
See id. (granting jurisdiction to the local criminal judges over minor offenses). The
Sch6ffengericht, a three-judge panel in the local court, is competent to hear cases involving a
potential sentence of up to four years imprisonment. See id §§ 28-30 (stating a
Sch~ffengericht panel consists of two lay judges presided over by one professional judge).
Cases with potential sentences of four or more years imprisonment-as well as any others of
special significance that the prosecutor deems appropriate for resolution in district court-
begin at the Landgericht level. See id. §§ 24, 74 (enumerating the criminal offenses over
which the district court has original jurisdiction).
82. See Dama~ka, supra note 67, at 131 (noting that a prosecutor's failure to secure a
conviction carries less stigma in Germany because the system may favor bringing charges
even when the prosecutor is not certain of a conviction).
83. From here forward, I use the word "state" as a substitute for the German term
Ldinder, while acknowledging that, although Germany possesses a federal system like the
United States, the distribution of power between federal and state entities differs.
84. There is also a smaller federal prosecution office known as the
Bundesanwaltschaft. The primary mandate of the Federal Prosecutor General
(Generalbundesanwall) and his staff is to represent the Federation before the Federal Court
of Justice. See GVG, supra note 74, § 142(l) (granting exclusive jurisdiction over cases in
the Federal Court of Justice to the Bundesanwaltschaft). Otherwise, their jurisdiction is
limited to prosecuting serious offenses implicating national interests (e.g., treason or
terrorism). See id. § 142(a) (detailing additional matters within the federal prosecutors'
domain). The Ldnder prosecution services represent the Federation at the Amtsgericht,
Landgericht, and Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) levels. See id. §§ 142(2), (3)
(delegating local, district-level, and regional responsibilities to the public prosecutors).
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is a political appointee, appointed by the state's Minister-President,
prosecutors are career civil servants, who are protected from arbitrary
dismissal after they complete a period of probationary service.8 Because
the prosecution service' s structure is relatively flat, the decision-making
practices that occur at the bottom of the organization determine the extent
to which those practices mirror the system's theoretical assumptions.8
Despite the fact that the prosecution service possesses a strong hierarchical
structure on paper, in practice, German prosecutors possess a great deal of
decision-making authority. 87  This authority stems from the flat
organizational structure; 88  the protection of lifetime employment;
89
increasing workloads;90 and a new, independent mindset found in young
prosecutors that have entered the service since the 1 970s. 91
85. See infra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutors' employment
protections); see also Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in
Comparison with American Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 239, 245 (1970) (describing the public
prosecution office as a hierarchy agency staffed by career civil servants). An exception to
that rule exists in four states, where the office of General Public Prosecutor
(Generalstaatsanwalt) is filled by a political appointee who serves at the pleasure of the
Minister of Justice. Regardless of that fact, all prosecutors at the state level are members of
a hierarchically ordered bureaucracy.
86. See e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY Xiii (1980) (arguing that
front-line workers work in a "corrupted world of service" in which work habits and attitudes
reflect the practical realities of the position).
87. See Erhard Blankenburg & Hubert Treiber, The Establishment of the Public
Prosecutor's Office in Germany, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 375, 375 (1985) (noting that the 1975
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure expanded considerably public prosecutors'
autonomy).
88. This flat structure reflects the judicial service's desire to preserve prosecutors'
independent decision-making authority. See Interview with Prosecutor-9BU (confidential
interview) (May 4, 2005) (noting the reason that the prosecution service has fewer career
steps than the administration is to encourage independence) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
89. Once prosecutors satisfactorily complete a two to three year probationary period
(Probezeit), they cannot be fired unless they commit a serious criminal offense. See
Interview with Prosecutor-5BC (confidential interview) (Jan. 16, 2006) (describing the rigid,
bureaucratic nature of the Staaitsanwaltschaft, the difficulty of securing advancement, as
well as the rarity of demotion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
90. See id. (observing excessive caseloads affect the public prosecution offices in
many ways, such as creating significant prosecutor autonomy).
91. See Interview with Appellate Judge- 13MU, supra note 31 (describing the young
prosecutors' movement in the 1970s to revitalize the prosecutorial corps through an ethos of
self-confidence and independence, as well as through their superior quality of work); see
also MODERNE STAATSANWALTSCHAFT: NoTwENDIGE REFORMEN STAATSANWALTSCHAFT
UND POLI 8 (1975) (arguing that prosecutors should abandon a culture of obedience).-
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At the local office level, the flat organizational structures are staffed
primarily with prosecutors holding the title of prosecutor (Staatsanwalt) or
supervising prosecutor (Oberstaatsanwalt).9 ' Offices are directed by a
Chief Office Prosecutor (Leitende Oberstaatsanwalt) and managed on the
departmental level by the supervisory prosecutors.93 The chief office
prosecutor possesses the authority to issue instructions to prosecutors
handling individual cases and may strictly oversee all of the department
managers. 94 The degree of individual decision-making discretion varies
from office to office and reflects the leadership style of each office's chief
prosecutor. Despite wide variations in management style, with respect to
the vast majority of their cases, individual prosecutors exercise a moderate
degree of decision-making room. 
96
Despite the fact that prosecutors possess more decision-making
discretion than ever before, their decisions are still not completely
autonomous because prosecutors remain embedded in institutions with
norms, expectations, and resource constraints. 97 As with many bureaucratic
organizations, there are internal guidelines that define case-handling
procedures.9 The degree of prosecutors' adherence to those guidelines
varies from office to office.99  The most important factor shaping
prosecutors' daily choices is not a set of written guidelines, but rather the
informal traditions of practice communicated from colleague to
colleague. 00 This communication takes place not in formal office meetings
92. See FOSTER, supra note 18, at 99-100 (describing the organization of the
prosecution offices).
93. Id at 100.
94. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor- I 3WT (confidential interview) (Dec. 6, 2005)
(noting that the chief office prosecutor will be involved in most serious cases and will
participate in preparing a report to the state Ministry of Justice) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
95. 1 found support for this statement in the course of conducting numerous interviews
in fourteen different prosecution offices.
96. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-5B3C, supra note 89 (noting subordinate
prosecutors are responsible for their own decisions and only consult superiors when making
difficult decisions regarding dismissals (Einstellung)).
97. See id (noting that cases are not always resolved quickly because of bureaucratic
restraints).
98. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-1I3WT, supra note 94 (explaining an internal
memo (Anweisung) from the Ministry dictating protocol for case assignments).
99. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor- I 8UE (confidential interview) (June 24, 2004)
(observing that a guideline would give him an overall objective but would not 'tie [his]
hands in individual cases") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
100. In their first six months on the job, new prosecutors consult with their supervisors
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but in informal coffee "meetings" held each morning between colleagues.' 0 '
At these "coffee meetings" amongst discussions of office gossip and social
plans, prosecutors discuss cases and try to come to a common point of view
on matters such as charging decisions and sentencing recommendations.)0 2
The case-related conversations at these meetings offer a forum for
exchanging information on office practices that are not found in code books
or formal guidelines.'03  Coffee breaks are an important mechanism
promoting organizational cohesion and education in prosecution offices.' 0
The meetings cut down on the isolation of prosecutors working in large,
bureaucratic organizations and represent a key horizontal means of
communication in an organizational structure that appears very hierarchical
on paper.
The informal transmission of these decision-making norms also helps
prosecutors recognize decision-making boundaries. While an individual
prosecutor may be free to make a decision outside those boundaries, in so
doing, the individual risks making a decision that may be tougher to defend
to the court or to a supervisor.1'0 In this way, the coffee meetings serve as a
vehicle for transmitting knowledge of organizational practices as well as a
often, as the supervisor must approve every written instruction that a new prosecutor writes.
See Interview with Prosecutor-lI3WT, supra note 94 (recalling close supervision by his chief
office prosecutor in the initial months of employment). It is through this process of
consultation with their supervisors and colleagues that new prosecutors learn not only the
language of writing instructions but also the standard decision-making practices employed
by prosecutors in the office. See id (noting the constructiveness of frequent discussions
with his chief prosecutor, colleagues, and police regarding ongoing cases). The initial
supervisor who signs off on a prosecutor's instructions in their first six months on the job
plays an instrumental role in helping to build the body of tacit knowledge that a new
prosecutor needs to perform the job. See id (noting the constructiveness of frequent
discussions with his chief prosecutor, colleagues, and police regarding ongoing cases).
101. See Interview with Prosecutor-5B3C, supra note 89 (noting one department leader's
(Abteiungleiter) view that coffee meetings are important in providing young prosecutors
with opportunities to trade opinions about cases).
102. See Interview with Prosecutor-4GG (confidential interview) (Jan. 30, 2006)
(stating that prosecutors use their coffee break discussions to arrive at a "common
understanding" regarding judges and case decisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
103. See id. (observing that an atmosphere of collegiality and mutual assistance
characterizes these meetings).
104. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting a cohesion benefit from coffee
breaks); see also infra note 106 and accompanying text (noting the educational benefits from
such meetings).
105. See Interview with Prosecutor- I 8UJE, supra note 99 (relating one prosecutor's
view that a "good prosecutor" is one who displays "some initiative" but is not "too
independent").
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mechanism that enhances decision-making conformity.' 0 6  The informal
communication between prosecutors creates a temporal link between
different generations of prosecutors as local practice norms are
communicated to new prosecutors.107 As one prosecutor described:
[T]his is typical what I do [every day], as you saw today at 10:00
o'clock I go to the Kaffeerunde [coffee circle]. As you saw today, it is
very funny, the young prosecutors, we have a lot of fun there. We can
discuss our files where we have problems where you have the general
question and you hear all the news in the office.'
08
The reference points provided by these collegial discussions impact
how a prosecutor handles a case in court. Because of scheduling practices,
the prosecutor who directed the investigation may not be the prosecutor
who handles the case at trial.' 09 In this circumstance, the prosecutor
assigned to handle the main proceeding will be more likely to consult the
prosecutor who investigated the case prior to trial to get his or her
perspective of the case and the recommended sentencing range." 0 For
example, in the Rosenberg case, discussed later in this Article, the trial
prosecutor came from the environmental crimes department."' In making
his sentencing recommendation, he deferred to his colleague's
recommendation.'"2 A courtroom prosecutor who fails to consult his or her
colleague risks damaging a collegial relationship. One young prosecutor
from the sexual crimes department recalled a prosecutor from the office's
106. See Interview with Prosecutor-13B1C (confidential interview) (Dec. 12, 2005)
(attributing some consistency in case-related decisions to the informal education of novice
prosecutors by other young prosecutors with greater experience) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
107. See Interview with Prosecutor- 1 3WT, supra note 94 (describing the value of a
close relationship with the Oberstaatsanwalt and ability to seek advice frequently from a
more experienced prosecutor).
108. Interview with Prosecutor-8PT (confidential interview) (Dec. 6, 2005) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
109. See Interview with Prosecutor- I 8UE, supra note 99 (stating the responsibility for a
case may shift after completion of the investigation).
110. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-lI3WT, supra note 94 (recounting one
prosecutor's experience with taking over another's rape case).
I111. See infra Part MVB (detailing a trial in which a Latvian national was charged with
forcibly raping a woman and stealing her purse).
112. See Interview with Prosecutor-lI3WTr, supra note 94 (noting that he deferred to the
investigating attorney's sentencing recommendation due to lack of experience in sex crimes
prosecutions).
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drug crimes unit reprimanding her for agreeing to a light sentence in a drug
case that she handled in court." 
3
This mindset, in which decision-making is informed by a sense of
collegial sensitivity, sometimes creates problems for prosecutors who rotate
into judicial positions throughout their career.' 14  As one appellate judge
commented:
[Iun Germany there is a possibility [to] begin your first [assignment] as a
prosecutor and you change, you become a judge. And later on, you go
back to the prosecutor['s office]... . [But] your mind will not begleiten
the change, will not follow the change. It's a real problem."I 
5
This culture of collegiality restricts the decision-making discretion of
prosecutors at trial in another way as well. When the prosecutor who
handles the case at trial differs from the prosecutor who supervised the case
investigation, the courtroom prosecutor may be hesitant to take actions that
implicitly criticize the quality of the investigation. This restriction on
decision-making freedom may strongly affect a prosecutor's interpretation
of objectivity in the courtroom.
Imagine a case where the investigating prosecutor failed to interview
several potential witnesses. If a defense counsel petitions the court to call
those witnesses to the stand, the courtroom prosecutor may be reluctant to
support that motion. It is not hard to imagine that the trial prosecutor may
be reluctant to overturn or implicitly criticize the prior work done on the
case. This may occur when the office practice is to check with the
prosecutor who investigated the case and seek their opinion on sentencing,
or when the investigating prosecutor will look for the results of the main
113. See Interview with Prosecutor-lI313C, supra note 106 (noting the drug crimes
prosecutor reprimanded her because the light sentence was inconsistent with their normal
penalties). Although most prosecutors would want to avoid this type of inter-departmental
policy conflict, this does not mean that a trial prosecutor is bound by the investigating
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation. Rather, according to one department supervisor,
the trial prosecutor is always free to disagree with the investigations results. See Interview
with Prosecutor- 1 3BR (confidential interview) (Nov. 18, 2005) (disagreeing with the claim
that a trial prosecutor cannot challenge the investigation results) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. In some German states (Ldnder), individuals do not remain in the prosecution
service for their entire career; instead, they rotate between positions in the prosecution
service, judiciary, and Ministry of Justice. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-8PT, supra
note 108 (discussing plans to return to school for a doctorate in law and then enter the
judiciary); see also Interview with Ministry Official-9CK (confidential interview) (May 4,
2006) (discussing perspective on sentencing decisions based on twelve-year tenure in the
judiciary) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
115. Interview with Appellate Judge-1I3MU, supra note 3 1.
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proceeding. In these cases, the investigating prosecutor has created a path-
dependent case trajectory-because a certain outcome is expected at trial,
the trial prosecutor is not completely free to look at the evidence with a
fresh set of eyes. In this way, subsequent prosecutors may be reluctant to
deviate from a prior understanding of the case at the expense of damaging
collegial relationships.
The degree to which the duty of objectivity shapes prosecutorial
decision-making varies."16  Some prosecutors may believe that they have
satisfied this duty when they make a charging decision that is not likely to
be overturned by their supervisor or the General Prosecutor's office. In the
context of trial, many prosecutors believe that if they comply with the
statutory requirement to make a closing argument that summarizes the facts
for and against the suspect, that action in itself is enough. Other
prosecutors sincerely weigh the testimony presented by each witness,
wrestle with the truth, and are not afraid to argue for acquittal when the
evidence at trial fails to satisfy the standard of proof.117
C. Normnative Theory of Prosecutorial Decision-Making
Consistent with the civil law vision of law as a science, judges and
prosecutors are expected to function as technical specialists who follow
predetermined legal rules, rather than as political officials who interpret the
law." 8  This vision of the law serves as the cornerstone of the legal
116. See Interview with Prosecutor-8PT, supra note 108 (describing as "outrageous" the
number of cases dropped in certain Ldnder due to the excessive workload, suggesting
adherence to the principle of legality is not uniform across the states).
117. Nearly every prosecutor interviewed was able to point to at least one case in which
they had asked for an acquittal. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-6SB (confidential
interview) (Feb. 23, 2006) (relating that she asked for acquittals after hearing the evidence
three to four times a year in small cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Although one would expect prosecutors to be concerned about incurring the wrath of their
supervisors in such cases, many prosecutors described their petitions for acquittal with pride.
That a prosecutor may discuss key decisions with his or her supervisor does not necessarily
mean that the prosecutor will hesitate to move for an acquittal at trial if unsure of the
suspect's guilt. See, e.g., id (noting this same prosecutor consulted her department manager
on decisions to dismiss any big cases, yet had asked for acquittal in two big cases in her
career). One sex crimes department prosecutor related that she had argued for an acquittal at
trial in ten cases in the previous two years. See Interview with Prosecutor-8AR (confidential
interview) (May 23, 2006) (noting a judge may ignore the request for acquittal and impose a
sentence, which defendants generally will appeal to the Landgericht) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of mandatory
prosecution and the prosecutor's duty of objectivity).
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system's legitimacy.' 19 To that end, it is critical that decision outcomes are
not seen as the end product of interpretive processes that serve as a cover
for the decision-makers policy preferences. 2 0 The principle of mandatory
prosecution serves as the centerpiece of normative dogmatic scheme that
seeks to control prosecutorial discretion and ensure that the law is applied
uniformly.'12 ' As Langbein states:
[T]he German rule of compulsory prosecution of serious crime is no
happenstance. The statutory standards, limitations, and remedies have
been meticulously designed to fit the institutional structure and to serve
the larger policies of the German criminal justice system. The rule is
meant to achieve ends that are immensely important in the German
tradition: treating like cases alike, obeying faithfully the legislative
determination to characterize something as a serious crime, preventing
political interference or other corruption from inhibiting prosecution,
and more.'122
The principle of mandatory prosecution is not the only constraint on
prosecutorial discretion. From a theoretical perspective, the scientific
nature of the law itself binds discretion by turning legal decision-making
into a routine, and primarily classificatory, exercise in logic. According to
many German legal scholars, a "right" legal answer exists for each legal
problem.123 The decision-making process does not rest on an individual's
interpretation of facts but rather the "correct subsumption under legal
caegres"124 Acrigy, facts and laws function as numerical values
that can be inserted into specific formulas that will produce the correct legal
answer. There is no range of possible correct answers generated by each
individual's own subjective lens.
Under this theory of legal decision-making, the investigation or "fact-
finding" process assumes an almost outcome-determinative significance.
The prosecutor, as master of the investigation stage of the proceedings,
119. See Langbein, supra note 63, at 449 ("In Savigny's famous phrase, the prosecutor
is the 'watchman of the law,' as evenhanded an officer of enforcement as could be
devised.").
120. See Dama~ka, supra note 67, at 125 (noting the German philosophy that
"[procedural rules] must not be softened by the dumb goddess of equity").
121. See Langbein, supra note 63, at 450 ("The dual function of the rule mirrors the
dual character of the German prosecutor's office: [H]e is obliged to perform an executive
function according to judicial standards of conduct.").
122. Langbein, supra note 4, at 211-12.
123. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the German theory of legal
decision-making as the placement of legally relevant facts within appropriate results boxes).
124. Dama~ka, supra note 67, at 125.
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performs a critically important function.125  By viewing facts through the
lens of the law, prosecutors make objective decisions. Moreover, despite
the fact that prosecutors are members of a bureaucracy, a prosecutor "does
not act as an administrator trying to attain practical goals; instead his
function is limited to the judicial task of applying the provisions of the
Penal Code to the facts of the case."126  This depiction of prosecutors as
objective decision-makers not only mirrors the image of the detached and
neutral judge but also is similar to the portrayal of the prototypical scientist.
XI. Relational Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision-Making
A. The Nature of the Prosecutor-Judge Relationship
Whether one envisions a prosecutor making a decision to file charges,
posing a certain question to a witness on the stand, or proffering a
sentencing recommendation to the court, it is evident that a prosecutor's
institutional role factors into his or her daily decision-making. Although
judges need not confirm a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute petty
offenses under Section 153 of the Strafprozessordnung (STPo), they must
approve the termination of proceedings in minor crime cases under Section
153(a).12 Moreover, the decision to open a main proceeding is made by a
judge after reviewing the investigative file collected by the prosecution
service. 28 In stark contrast to criminal practice in the United States, the
negotiation of plea agreements in Germany involves the court. 2  In some
instances, judges will initiate the plea negotiation process by contacting the
prosecutor or defense attorney to explore whether the case may be resolved
short of a full main proceeding.130 Thus, while German law defines their
125. See Jescheck, supra note 62, at 509-10 (noting that "the functional subordination
of the police" to the prosecutor subjects the entire investigative process to this prosecutorial
discretion, as colored by the Legal itdtprinzip mandate).
126. Joachim Hermann, The German Prosecutor, in DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE
AND AMERICA 16, 18 (Kenneth Gulp Davis ed., 1974).
127. See STPO, supra note 7, § 153(a) (permitting the prosecution office, subject to the
court's consent, to forego issuing public charges in favor of the imposition of fines, driving
school, community service, or mediation with the victim).
128. See id. § 199 (directing the competent court to review the indictment and
investigation dossier, and decide whether to dismiss the case or open main proceedings).
129. See JENiA 1. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 104 (2009) (noting most
German courts participate in plea bargaining from the outset in serious cases, though in
minor cases negotiations may be confined to the prosecutor and defense attorney at first).
130. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-6SB, supra note 117 (noting that juvenile
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function as second judges, they are second judges who cannot act fully
independently of the judiciary.
Although procedural rules reinforce the prosecutor's role as a second
judge, those procedures, standing alone, do not guarantee that a prosecutor
will take an active role in searching for the truth. For example, while a
prosecutor may comply with the procedural rule that requires prosecutors to
summarize the facts for and against the accused, that rule does not require a
prosecutor to pose questions to witnesses in an effort to resolve factual
ambiguities. 13 1  It is thus possible for a prosecutor to comply on a
superficial level with the duty of objectivity by participating in certain
procedures that have become mere ritualized manifestations of that duty.
While statutory mandates force prosecutors to pay lip service to
objectivity, the level of reflexivity mandated by the law is limited. 13 1 In
fact, in my interviews, prosecutors would point to the fact that they had
summarized the evidence in favor of the accused at the conclusion of trial-
supporting the contention that German prosecutors did, in fact, view the
case through an objective lens.'13 3  Nonetheless, a prosecutor's minimal
court judges or defense counsel will always be first to propose a plea agreement). Several
prosecutors, as well as one former judge, noted that informal pre-trial conversations between
prosecutors and judges occur regularly. See, e.g., Interview with Ministry Official-9CK,
supra note 114 (recalling that as a judge he would sometimes remand the application for
main proceedings with instructions to remedy defects in the investigation file); see also
Interview with Prosecutor-4GG, supra note 102 (noting that, especially in cases involving
direct citizen complaints making meritless charges against another citizen, it is common for
the prosecutor to send in the application with the investigation file but then telephone the
judge and request him to deny main proceedings).
131. See, e.g., STPO, supra note 7, § 293(l) (requiring the public prosecutor to examine
prosecution witnesses, but not extending this requirement to defense witnesses).
132. See, e.g., id. § 243(3) (requiring the prosecutor to read charges and submit a legal
assessment at the beginning of a proceeding in court).
133. See Participant Observation-3TW (Nov. 9, 2005) (discussing the prosecutor's duty
to summarize the evidence both in favor of and against the defendant and, if necessary,
reconmnend a verdict in favor of the defendant) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). I observed the conclusion of a main proceeding in a fraud case involving two
female defendants who had ordered a number of products online but never paid for the
products. Id In the prosecutor's final argument, the prosecutor pointed out that the value of
the fraud committed had been relatively small and that the merchandise ordered were gifts
for one of the defendant's children. Id. The prosecutor also mentioned that both defendants
had confessed and that they had expressed remorse. Id The prosecutor then moved on to
cite that the main points against the defendants were that their criminal behavior reflected a
certain level of initiative and intelligence. Id For example, the defendants had put false
names on their mailboxes that corresponded to the aliases that the suspects had used to order
the merchandise. Id.
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compliance with ritualized procedural requirements may not move the
truth-finding process forward.
From an empirical standpoint, it cannot be said that a prosecutor
functions as a "second judge" on the basis of a single prosecutorial decision.
For example, a prosecutor who merely summarizes the evidence presented
at trial cannot be said to function objectively if the prosecutor failed to
order the police to pursue potentially exculpatory evidence during the
investigation phase. Discovering the meaning of objectivity in practice
requires going beyond a mere checklist evaluation of prosecutorial
practices. In an effort to bring the analysis of prosecutorial objectivity
beyond mere conformity with procedural requirements, I explore the
relational stance that a prosecutor takes vis-i-vis the presiding judge in a
courtroom to produce a richer analysis of the face of prosecutorial
obj ectivity. Since the presiding judge organizes the presentation of
evidence and initiates the questioning of witnesses at trial, a prosecutor's
stance in the courtroom is necessarily reactive and responsive., 14 It is the
presiding judge who sets the tone for the main proceeding and the
prosecutor who decides how to position himself or herself in relation to the
role that the judge plays in the courtroom.' As one prosecutor described
it, "the prosecutor's task in the courtroom is a difficult one."' Before
making a recommendation that the court should convict or acquit a
defendant, a prosecutor' s main task is to "clarify' the facts of the case."1
3 1
Given this role, it is erroneous to say that a prosecutor has a completely
disinterested stake in the main proceeding.138  What actions a prosecutor
134. See Interview with Prosecutor-8AR, supra note 117 (describing the process of
asking questions at a main proceeding).
135. See Interview with Prosecutor-1I8UE, supra note 99 (discussing professional
dynamics in the German courtroom). The ambiguous nature of the prosecutor's role is
reflected in courtroom architecture throughout Germany. See Interview with Prosecutor-
5BGC, supra note 89 (describing the theory behind the arrangement of furniture in German
courtrooms). In some courtrooms, the prosecutor takes a seat adjacent to and level with the
judge or judicial panel. Id. In other courtrooms, the prosecutor sits at a table that is separate
from the judicial bench and on par with the defense counsel's seat in the courtroom. See
Participant Observation- 13 WT (Dec. 8, 2005) (describing alternative courtroom
arrangement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). According to one senior
prosecutor, older courtrooms tend to conform to the former style which reflected a view of
the prosecutor as an "organ of the judiciary." Interview with Prosecutor-5B3C, supra note 89.
The newer courtrooms which conform to the later style reflect a view of the prosecutor as an
"organ ofjustice." Id.
136. Interview with Prosecutor- I8IJE, supra note 99.
137. Interview with Prosecutor-5DK (confidential interview) (Jan.19, 2006) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. See id (arguing that the prosecutors' role in the investigation affects their
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might take to accomplish that task may differ depending on their own level
of initiative as well as the clarity of the evidence presented. According to
one experienced prosecutor:
[1] listen to the evidence presented in the main proceeding .... I then
must summarize the evidence at the end of the proceeding and explain
why I believe whether a certain charge has been proven or not. I will
state whether [I think] a witness has lied and whether or not theyr have
told the truth. . ... I will state why a witness is credible [or not].
At the outset, it should be noted that procedural factors encourage
cooperation between judges and prosecutors. From a procedural
perspective, the prosecutor's office supervises the collection of evidence,
documents that evidence in written form, and presents that written file to
the court.'140  Therefore, both judge and prosecutor enter the main
proceeding having formed preliminary assessments of the case based on a
shared body of evidence. This decision-making lens is starkly different
from the lens possessed by the jurors, who serve as fact-finders in
American courtrooms and are likely to be unfamiliar with the evidence that
will be presented in court."4 '
There is a second procedural factor that encourages cooperation.
Because the prosecutor functions as a "second judge" rather than as a party,
it is perfectly legitimate for a judge to speak with a prosecutor without
communicating with the defense attorney.142  In fact, it is a common
practice for a judge and a prosecutor to speak before a proceeding to get a
sense of the other's view of the case.'143 Since most criminal cases do not
present complicated legal issues, the court's attention during the main
objectivity).
139. Interview with Prosecutor-12C1 (confidential interview) (Nov. 29, 2005) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
140. See STPO, supra note 7, §§ 158-77 (detailing procedures for investigation and
preparation of public charges).
141. This assumes no significant pretrial publicity of the case.
142. See Interview with Ministry-9CK, supra note 114 (describing pre-trial
communication between judges and prosecutors).
143. See id. (describing the close working relationship between judge and prosecutor).
A prosecutor may work in tandem with the judge on a case in which no main proceeding is
held. See id. (detailing cooperation between judges and prosecutors). See also Interview
with Prosecutor-4GG, supra note 102 (detailing how prosecutors will sometimes work in
tandem with judges to try to get a judge to refuse to open a case by determining that there is
insufficient evidence to open a main proceeding). This cooperation may be helpful to
prosecutors who may be reluctant to close a case themselves short of trial because the victim
in the case is likely to file a complaint with the Generalstaatsanwalt's office. See id.
(discussing a provoking dismissal by ajudge).
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proceeding is focused primarily on collecting facts and determining an
appropriate sentence.'"4 The pre-trial conversations allow judges and
prosecutors to determine points of agreement and disagreement prior to the
presentation of evidence. They may also identify areas in which the
evidence is conflicting and uncertain. These conversations are more likely
to occur when either the judge or the prosecutor is relatively inexperienced
and would like to ameliorate the decision-making uncertainty that comes
with that inexperience.
From a normative perspective, a German prosecutor should enter the
trial with an open mind. In fact, according to an appellate judge that I
interviewed, when a prosecutor states publicly prior to trial that he or she is
convinced that a suspect is guilty, it violates the duty of objectivity.14
Commitment to this duty is underscored by the fact that German
prosecutors do not meet with the witnesses prior to trial and attempt to
shape their testimony or structure the presentation of witnesses to convince
a jury of the defendant's guilt. 146 Ideally, a prosecutor should approach the
trial with an open mind. The structure of questioning in German
courtrooms supports this unrehearsed style. Unlike American procedure,
the form of the questions and answers is less regulated.14 7 Witnesses often
give long narrative answers, which American courtrooms would consider to
be unresponsive. This unregulated style and the lack of witness preparation
makes the presentation of evidence at trial less certain. According to one
prosecutor, even though a prosecutor may have presented the court with a
thick file, the facts that are "revealed" at trial may change your opinion of
the case. 148 The fact that the judge structures the presentation of evidence at
trial and conducts most of the questioning combined with this less
constrained structure of the evidence presentation gives the prosecutor the
opportunity to view the evidence from a more objective standpoint.
144. See Stefan Machura, Interaction Between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges
in German Mixed Courts, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 451, 454 (2001) (explaining most German
criminal cases are legally simple, thus the court focuses on facts).
145. See Interview with Appellate Judge-13MU, supra note 31 (discussing duty of
prosecutor to remain objective).
146. See Interview with Prosecutor-3TW, supra note 133 (noting that prosecutors do
not meet with witnesses to prepare them for trial); see also Interview with Prosecutor-4GG,
supra note 102 (describing the German view of U.S. justice system).
147. See, e.g., STPO, supra note 7, § 239 (describing questioning by the judge,
prosecutor, and defense counsel).
148. See Interview with Prosecutor- 120J, supra note 139 (stating that witness
testimony at trial may reveal new information that changes your opinion of the case).
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Because most of the evidence-collection process is dominated by the
police, a prosecutor may have prepared the case file and filed charges
without ever meeting a single witness. 149  In this circumstance, the
courtroom procedure may give the prosecutor his or her first opportunity to
size up the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the defendant. In sexual
assault cases, which may turn on the credibility of the victim and the
defendant, there may be more factual uncertainty at the outset of trial than
in other types of cases.' 50 It is possible to theorize that, in sexual assault
cases, German prosecutors may possess a more open mind toward the
evidence than in other types of cases; additionally, they may be more
inclined to adopt a less biased stance towards the testimony presented at
trial."5 ' In the United States, on the other hand, the prosecutor's opinion is
largely set in stone before the trial, and the trial is a play designed to
"show" those facts to the jury. 5 2 Evaluating and weighing the evidence in
rape cases can be difficult for prosecutors when the case comes down to the
suspect's word versus the victim's word.
These procedural differences between the unstructured presentation of
testimony in German courtrooms and the rigid evidentiary rules in
American courtrooms reflect different normative visions of the path to
"truth." As Elisabetta Grande has pointed out, in "the Continental world,
149. The role played by the police in the investigation process differs depending on the
nature of the crime as well as the investigation practices of a particular prosecution office.
See STPO, supra note 7, § 163 (discussing the duties of the police to conduct criminal
investigations). In general, a prosecutor handling a sexual assault case will be more
involved in the investigation than a prosecutor in other departments. It remains true,
however, that the prosecutor may not have actually met the victim prior to trial.
150. See, e.g., Participant Observation-1I3WT, supra note 135 (describing a rape trial
where the credibility of the victim was in serious doubt).
15 1. See Grande, supra note 65, at 155 (comparing adversarial and inquisitorial justice
systems).
152. In the American system, prosecutors attempt to structure witness testimony in a
way that will "prove" their case, to secure a conviction, on the charges set forth in the
complaint. The rules of evidence, through the prohibition on using leading questions on
direct examination, attempt to ensure that the presenting party is not shaping the testimony
to advance that party's version of the truth. By permitting opposing counsel to use leading
questions during cross-examination, the rules also attempt to subject testimony to the rigor
of being fully tested by opposing counsel. Yet, there is no prohibition on meeting with
witnesses prior to trial and rehearsing testimony (as long as the lawyer is not suborning
perjury). To secure a conviction, a prosecutor may meet with the key witnesses prior to trial
to ensure that the witness testifies in a manner that will help the prosecutor convince the jury
that the defendant is guilty as charged. See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by
Prosecutors, 23 CAjtnozo L. REV. 829, 833-44 (2002) (arguing that it is evident that
prosecutors coach witnesses and that some prosecutors do it with the objective of
encouraging false or misleading testimony).
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neutrality is still considered attainable in the criminal process" and officials
are still charged with searching for the objective rather than an
"interpretive" truth.153 The alchemy of justice is not achieved through strict
reliance on a fair process, but rather through a neutral search for a
substantive truth.'154 Viewed from this perspective, the prosecutor's duty of
objectivity in the German system requires that prosecutors make a more
robust commitment to discovering the objective truth.
Where German prosecutors start to show an adversarial face in a
certain case, the judge may discount their opinion.' 55 As one Justice
Ministry official related to me, when prosecutors from a certain prosecution
office acquired a reputation for recommending harsh sentences in the
courtroom, the judges stopped treating the prosecutors as second judges
whose opinion should be considered with the deference accorded to a
colleague and instead discounted their opinion as a party opinion.' 
56
B. A Proposed Model of Prosecutorial Behavior at Trial
For analytical purposes, one might imagine three different stances that
a prosecutor might adopt towards the judge's presentation of evidence in
the main proceeding. First, a prosecutor might elect to play an acquiescent
role in the courtroom, in which he or she asks few questions of the
witnesses and is content to allow the court's presentation of evidence to
stand on its own. Second, a prosecutor might play a supportive role in the
courtroom by asking questions and making arguments that support the
judge's understanding of the case. Finally, a prosecutor might disagree
with the judge's conclusion of the case and play an independent role in the
courtroom.
To some extent, these categories over-simplify prosecutorial decision-
making because a prosecutor's actions may not fit neatly into a single
category. However, these categories are useful analytical constructs
because they allow us to categorize prosecutorial behavior and create a
richer description of how prosecutors interpret their duty to function as
"second judges" and to begin to identify factors that may influence the
153. Grande, supra note 65, at 155.
154. See id at 159 (describing the introduction of all relevant evidence, even if defendant
may not confront it).
155. See Interview with Ministry-9CK, supra note 114 (describing the disregard of a
prosecutor's opinion when the judge viewed him as biased).
156. See id (discussing disregard for harsh recommendations).
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strategy that a prosecutor adopts during trial. To the extent that the factors
that drive a choice of strategy are institution-based, understanding those
factors will shed light on how organizational factors shape the meaning of
prosecutorial objectivity. To that end, it is useful to define three different
potential trial strategies.
In postulating what an acquiescent trial strategy might look like, one
might include the following behaviors:
1 . The prosecutor chooses not to ask questions that might provide
more detail into the nature of the events that have transpired.
2. The prosecutor takes no active steps to challenge witness
credibility.
3. The prosecutor does not attempt to acquire background
information on the defendant's life circumstances.
4. The prosecutor does not petition the court to fill in evidentiary
gaps in the evidence.
5. Although the prosecutor is not convinced that the suspect is
guilty, the prosecutor would recommend that the court convict
the defendant if the court is leaning towards conviction.
In postulating what a supportive trial strategy might look like, one
might include the following behaviors:
1 . The prosecutor takes the initiative to determine what the
judge's view of the evidence is prior to the commencement of
the main proceeding.
2. The prosecutor plays an active role in questioning the
witnesses, but asks questions that attempt to fill in the gaps in
the judge's theory of the case.
3. The prosecutor recommends a sentence that will provide the
court with a reference point for its own sentencing decision.157
Finally, in categorizing the trial behaviors of a prosecutor who plays
an independent role, those behaviors might include:
157. As one former judge explained to me, in some cases that at first glance look like there is
disagreement between the sentencing recommendation made by the prosecutor and the judge's
sentence, the prosecutor has elected to make a recommendation that is purposely more severe than
the sentence that the court will impose. See Interview with Ministry-9CK, supra note 114
(discussing sentencing). By inflating their sentencing recommendation, the prosecutor may be
trying to increase the likelihood that the defendant will not file an appeal. Id The greater the
difference between the judge's final determination and the prosecutor's recommendation, the
more likely it will be that the defendant will not challenge the sentence by filing an appeal. Id
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1. Reaching an independent opinion of witness credibility and
stating that opinion in the final argument to the court.
2. Arguing in favor of acquittal when the court seeks to convict or
arguing in favor of conviction when the court believes that the
evidence is insufficient.
3. Posing provocative questions to witnesses to test their
credibility.
4. Suggesting that the court obtain further evidence such as
calling additional witnesses to testify.
It is important to note that although a prosecutor may elect to act
independently of the judge, a judge may concur with the prosecutor's
assessment of the case.118 In fact, this scenario may represent the ideal script
from a normative perspective-the two institutions, acting independent of
each other, reach the same legal conclusion.15 9 In this spirit, one prosecutor
stated that:
[M~y] satisfaction comes from making a decision about a case that the
court concurs in. When the court agrees with my recommendation, I feel
that I have fulfilled my duty. I am not satisfied and can get annoyed when
the judges ignore my recommendations and make decisions that I think
are incorrect.160
IV The Construction of Prosecutorial Objectivity: A Look at Three Cases
A. Overview
The German Code of Criminal Procedure defines a minimal set of bench-
line parameters designed to ensure that prosecutors function as neutral and
objective second judges in the courtroom.'16' In this Section, I examine the
decisions made by three prosecutors in three different sexual assault cases in
order to understand how prosecutors interpret this duty. I have purposely
selected three cases in which the "truth" was difficult to determine in order to
highlight the complex range of prosecutorial behavior in the courtroom.
Although the task of evaluating the evidence may be straightforward, there are
158. See id (describing communications prior to the main proceeding).
159. See id. (describing views on cooperation).
160. Interview with Prosecutor-5DK, supra note 137.
161. See generally STPO, supra note 7, Part HI (describing the prosecutor's role in a main
proceeding).
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many cases in which the evidence conflicts. These cases offer a rich opportunity
to see how prosecutors navigate an uncertain truth-finding process.
It is important to note that the definition of rape in Germani criminal law
makes the prosecution of rape cases more difficult. In the words of one sexual
crimes prosecutor, the definition of rape under German law is "archaic," because
the victim's lack of consent is not sufficient. 62 The court must find that the
suspect used force or a serious threat to effectuate the crime.'161 The threat Must
refer to a loss of life or a serious injury.'6' While some courts have shown their
willingness to interpret the requirement of force liberally, this requirement
represents a hurdle that is not found today in many other Westemn countries.1
6 1
This requirement, coupled with the fact that the evidence in sexual assault cases
may be conflicting and subject to interpretation, often means that the central
evidentiary issue facing prosecutors is the credibility of the victim.' 66 While
prosecutors in some jurisdictions commonly rely on reports prepared by expert
witnesses to evaluate a victim's credibility,167 in other jurisdictions prosecutors
will retain expert witnesses only if the victim is extremely young or suffers from
a mental disorder'1
68
B. Case Onte: Rosenberg
In the first case, the investigating prosecutor charged a Latvian national with
forcibly raping a woman and stealing her purse in a large German city
162. See Interview with Prosecutor-8PT, supra note 108 (comparing German and English
rape laws).
163. See id. (describing German rape law).
164. See STAFGESETZLBUCH [STGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BLJNDESGESETzBLArr,
TIEL I [BGBL. 1] at 3322, as amended § 177 (Ger.) [hereinafter STGB] (describing the offense of
rape). STGB § 177 states:
Whoever coerces another person: 1) with force; 2) by a threat of imminent danger to
life or limb; or 3) by exploiting a situation in which the victim is unprotected and at
the mercy of the perpetrator's influence, to suffer the commission of sexual acts of
the perpetrator or a third person on himself or to commit them on the perpetrator or a
third person shall be punished ....
Id
165. See Interview with Prosecutor-8PT, supra note 108 (discussing the force requirement
of German rape law).
166. See id (discussing bias in rape trials).
167. See Interview with Prosecutor-7CX (confidential interview) (Apr. 7, 2006) (discussing
how the victim is typically evaluated by a psychologist before trial) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
168. See Interview with Prosecutor-8AR, supra note 117 (describing the use of a
Gutachten).
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(Rosenberg).169  The case was handled at trial by a prosecutor who
does not normally handle sexual assault cases. 170 Prior to trial, the trial
prosecutor contacted the prosecutor who had directed the investigation
and was told that an appropriate sentence in the case would be three
years.'17  According to the complaint in the case file, the defendant
attacked a woman behind a public restroomn on the city's pedestrian
mall.172  The investigating prosecutor had alleged that the suspect had
violated statutes prohibiting assault with bodily injury,173 rape, 174 and
169. See Interview with Prosecutor-1I3WT, supra note 94 (describing the charges in the
Rosenburg case). Please note that Rosenberg is a pseudonym.
170. See id. (discussing the unusual nature of the current case for the assigned prosecutor).
171. See id (discussing the sentencing recommendation of the prosecutor who drafted the
charge).
172. See Participant Observation-lI3Wf, supra note 135 (describing the charges read in
court).
173. See STGB, supra note 164, § 223 (detailing German bodily injury law). Section 223
provides: "(1) Whoever physically maltreats or harms the health of another person, shall be
punished with imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine. (2) An attempt shall be
punishable." Id
174. See id § 177 (detailing German rape law). Section 177 provides:
(1) Whoever coerces another person:
1. with force;
2. by a threat of imminent danger to life or limb; or
3. by exploiting a situation in which the victim is unprotected and at the mercy of the
perpetrator's influence, to suffer the commission of sexual acts of the perpetrator or a
third person on himself or to commit them on the perpetrator or a third person, shall
be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year.
(2) In especially serious cases the punishment shall be imprisonment for not less than
two years. An especially serious case exists, as a rule, if:
1. the perpetrator completes an act of sexual intercourse with the victim or commits
similar sexual acts on the victim, or allows them to be committed on himself by the
victim, which especially degrade the latter, especially if they are combined with
penetration of the body (rape); or
2. the act is committed jointly by more than one person.
(3) Imprisonment for not less than thr-ee years shall be imposed, if the perpetrator:
1. carries a weapon or another dangerous tool;
2. otherwise carries a tool or means in order to prevent or overcome the resistance of
another person through force or threat of force; or
3. places the victim by the act in danger of serious health damage. (4) Imprisonment
for not less than five years shall be imposed, if:
1. the perpetrator uses a weapon or another dangerous tool during the act; or
2. the perpetrator:
a) seriously physically maltreats the victim through the act; or
b) places the victim in danger of death through the act.
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robbery. '
According to the facts stated in the complaint, the suspect hit Frau H.
on the back of her head with his fist; forced Frau H. to have anal intercourse
with him; and finally took Frau H.'s pocketbook containing the victimss
keys and money before leaving the crime scene. 716  While the police
investigation revealed that the victim was in a blackout at the time of the
alleged rape, the officers took statements from two other witnesses.177 One
was a Turkish gentleman who, for cultural reasons, was extremely reluctant
to describe what he observed in open court.178 The second was an elderly
woman who witnessed the defendant leaving the crime scene.1
7 9
In accord with German criminal procedure, the prosecutor read the
complaint in open court to commence the trial.'180  The judge then began
questioning the defendant about his personal circumstances.' 8 ' Although he
was not required to do so, at this time, the defendant elected to tell the
judge his account of the events. 182 Although the defendant began to tell the
judge what happened in general terms, the judge stepped in and posed
specific questions to the defendant.183  The defendant related to the court
that he was a Latvian resident and currently separated from his wife.' 84 At
the time of his arrest, he was traveling through Germany on his way to
France to look for work. 88' He proceeded to tell the court that on the date
(5) In less serious cases under subsection (1), imprisonment from six months to five
years shall be imposed, in less serious cases under subsections (3) and (4),
imprisonment from one year to ten years.
Id
175. See id § 249 (detailing the German crime of robbery). Section 249 provides:
(1) Whoever, by force against a person or the use of threats of imminent danger to
life or limb, takes moveable property not his own from another with the intent of
appropriating the property for himself or a third person, shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than one year.
(2) In less serious cases the punishment shall be imprisonment from six months to
five years.
Id




180. See STPO, supra note 7, § 136(l) (detailing the first examination of the accused).
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in question he had been drinking with six to eight people when a young
woman approached the group. 1 16  The suspect claimed that the young
woman propositioned two other men in the group before she walked up to
him, put her key in his pocket, and told him that she wanted to go with him
to her house.187 The suspect followed the young woman willingly out of the
bar, walking with her along the pedestrian walkway until they reached the
public toilet facilities. 188 At that point, Frau H. lifted up her shirt and kissed
him.189 They proceeded to have consensual sex.' 90 During the defendant's
entire testimony, the prosecutor only posed a single question to the
defendant-namely, whether he had struck the victim on the back of her
head.' 9'
The first witness to take the stand was the alleged victim, Frau H.'1
92
According to the complaint the victim was a twenty-seven year old
unemployed woman, living on government support in a small town on the
city outskirts.' The judge's initial questioning proceeded as follows:194
Judge: On the fifth of September there were charges made.
We heard from Mr. S. Now we would like to hear from
you what happened.
Frau H.: I went to the police .. 9
Only a few minutes into Frau H.'s testimony, the prosecutor
interrupted:
Prosecutor: Have you been drinking today. I can smell alcohol.
Frau H.: Yes. I had 2-3 vodkas this morning. I was nervous.19
At this interesting juncture, the defense attorney alleged that the









194. As the proceedings were not recorded or taped, I compiled the "transcript" from my
handwritten notes.
195. Participant Observation-1I3WT, supra note 135.
196. Id
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could not understand the importance of telling the truth.' 97 The judge,
however, hearing no objection from the prosecutor, allowed the questioning
to proceed.198 As the victim continued to testify, it became apparent that
she remembered little from the event:
Judge: Can you describe him?
Frau H.: Thin. Tall... the defendant is now bigger.
Judge: We have photos in the file. Please come forward and
look at them.
Frau H.: [Pointing to a picture of the suspect in the file]. He
kissed me. . . I am not sure.
Judge: Do you remember identifying the suspect to the police?
Frau H.: I went to the police [voice trails off].
Judge: The suspect has a good memory. We need to know the
truth. The suspect said that you kissed and you gave
him your key and that you wanted to take him to your
apartment. We have photos from the crime scene that
you can look at. Do you remember these steps? [Judge
points to a photo].
Frau H.: [No response].
Judge: The suspect said that you pulled up your t-shirt and
walked arm in arm. Then you went behind the toilet
and removed'your pants.
Defense: If she doesn't remember ... [cut off by victim].
Frau H.: I was at the toilet. It hurt.
Judge: What happened here? [The judge points to a photo in
the file of the public restroom].
Frau H.: I tried to take my purse. I can 't remember. I was
drunk. [She begins to cry]. I can't say clearly. I
didn't give anyone my key. He lifted my t-shirt and
took my pocketbook away. I'm sure he took my
purse ....
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Judge: You are only here as a witness. We just want to know
what the truth is. Did it take a long time or was it a
short time? .. . It is important that you tell us what you
remember. You have a duty to tell the truth. Did he hit
or force you?
Prosecutor: Can you remember the steps?
Frau H.: There was pressure on my head and pain. My purse
was gone. He pulled it away from my arm.
Prosecutor: Do you know that or do you suspect that?
Frau H.: I was so drunk that I could not stand. I tried to push
him away. What could it have been?
Judge: I believe that you are trying to be objective. .... Are
there further questions?
Frau H.: I can definitely say that he took my purse away. 199
These excerpts illustrate the critical role that the presiding judge plays
in leading the fact-finding process at trial and suggest that the prosecutor
acted as a neutral fact-finder during Frau H.'s questioning. It was the
prosecutor, rather than the defense attorney or the judge, who first raised
the issue of the victim's competency to testify. 200 During the trial the
prosecutor continued to press the victim, adopting an almost confrontational
stance .201 For example, while the prosecutor tried to ascertain whether or
not the rape was committed forcibly, he probed the accuracy of victim's
20
memory. 02The tone of the questions that he proffered to the victim was
not the tone of a supportive advocate; rather, he adopted the tone of an
individual determined to test the victim's credibility. 0
Because the prosecutor had not personally supervised the case
investigation, he faced an additional challenge at trial when it became
evident there were several witnesses cited in the police report whom the
police never elected to interview.2 Prior to trial, neither the investigating
prosecutor, nor the judge, nor the defense attorney deemed it necessary to
attempt to locate these individuals. When this prosecutor was assigned to
199. Id.
200. See id. (describing the prosecutor's questioning of Frau H. regarding whether she
had been drinking).
201. See id. (relating the prosecutor's aggressive questioning).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., id (describing Frau H.'s recollection of a Polish man).
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handle the court hearing, the investigative file had already been sent to the
court .20 ' The trial prosecutor himself was only in possession of the
prosecution office's thin court file (Handakte), which did not contain all of
the evidence collected in the case.20 It is also surprising that the
investigating attorney did not petition the court to appoint an expert
witness. 0 German prosecutors frequently ask the court to hire a
psychological expert witness in cases in which the credibility of the victim
may be questioned. 0
Given that the defendant's testimony was evasive and the victim's
testimony inconclusive, the chances for obtaining a conviction in the case
rested on the remaining witnesses .209  The key remaining witness was a
Turkish gentleman who had previously told the police that he had witnessed
a rape.21 Unfortunately, when it came time for to testify in court, the
witness was extremely reticent.21 In the excerpt below, both the judge and
the prosecutor press the witness to explain what he had seen. 
212
Additionally, the prosecutor invokes the full power of the state by
threatening to file charges against the witness to force him to reveal the
truth.2t In this capacity, the prosecutor not only supports the judge's
efforts, but additionally he plays the role of the "bad cop." Within the
context of his quasi-judicial role, the prosecutor has room to play the heavy
hand.
Judge: What can you say about how the woman appeared?
Was she drunk?
Witness: The girl was very drunk She was in his arms... I
don 't know if it was rape.. .
205. See id. (discussing the charges filed by a different prosecutor).
206. See id (explaining that the trial prosecutor often goes to trial with a file prepared
by his colleague).
207. See Interview with Prosecutor-7CX, supra note 167 (discussing typicality of
psychological evaluations in rape cases). Another prosecutor told me that she will ask for an
expert opinion in any case in which she is not sure whether or not the victim is telling the
truth. See Interview with Prosecutor-8AR, supra note 117 (describing the use of experts in
rape trials).
208. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-24AZ (confidential interview) (Apr. 10, 2008)
(discussing the prevalence of expert testimony in rape cases) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review),
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Judge: You only need to say what you saw. You don 't need to
say if you think it was a criminal act. [The judge
begins reading part of the witness's prior statement to
the police]. "The man had pushed the woman against
the wall. He grabbed her arm and then lifted her
clothes high. "
Witness: That is correct.
Judge: I believe you. We just need to know what happened.
Witness: I told the police that I saw a crime.
Judge: I don 't expect you to say whether or not it was a rape.
What really happened? [The Judge continues reading
from the witness's prior statement given to the police].
"He put his hands on her breasts. He left by himself
with her pocketbook. "
What did you see of the rape? A rape occurs when
someone has sex with force.
Witness: Yes.
Judge: You told the police more than you are saying here. You
don't need to be ashamed to say these things. Just say
what you saw. Just tell us about the crime. In Germany
it is a crime. [The Judge continues reading the file].
"He kissed her on the breasts."
Witness: Yes. That is normal.
Judge: No, that is not normal. [Emphatically].
Witness: IJam a foreigner.
Judge: You have lived in Germany for ten years. How often
have you seen this on the street? Three months is not
so long. What can you remember? What did you see
after he kissed her on the breast?
Witness: He licked and kissed the breast.
Judge: How was the woman standing?
Witness: Her back was on the toilet. It was a rape.
Judge: [Reading from the witness's prior statement to the
police]. "The man pushed the woman's arms away.
He opened his pants and took his penis out and pushed
her head. . .. "
Witnss: I can't say.Witness:
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Prosecutor: [With raised voice]. "Stop playing with us and tell us
what you know. " [Slamming his fist onto the table]. "I
can charge you with a crime. ... the failure to report a
rape."i21
4
Witness: IJam not a child
Judge: Just tell us what you saw.
Witness: "7 saw him take her arm... he grabbed her breast and
pushed her head I can 't remember more ... he went
away. o
Finally, in the following excerpt extracted from the prosecutor's
concluding statement, the prosecutor weighs the inconsistencies in the
testimony presented during the proceeding. 1 Because none of the
witnesses who testified had stated that the defendant had used violence
while raping the victim, in response to the suggestion of the presiding
judge, the prosecutor elected not to argue that the case qualified as a rape
under the definition provided in Section 177717 After the trial, he explained
that obtaining a conviction under Section 177 was precluded by the fact that
the victim had made conflicting statements about the use of force .2 18 At one
point Frau H. testified that the defendant had forcefully hit her head against
219
the wall; later in her testimony, however, she contradicted that statement.
Prosecutor: What crime do we have here? It is not clear how much
alcohol the victim consumed The defendant himself
said he met the victim and talked to her and that she
had been drinking. We know that they went to the
public toilet. He kissed her. He pushed her against the
wall. There was intercourse with force. The case is
difficult ... the victim cried out. The defendant left the
area with the victim's purse.
The defendant has denied that he stole the victim's
purse. But one witness said that she saw the defendant
214. See, e.g., Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A German
Perspective, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 160-61 (2003) (stating that the investigation
process in inquisitorial systems only works when a person is willing to reveal what they
know).
215. Participant Observation- I3WT, supra note 135.
216. Id.
217. Id
218. Interview with Prosecutor-13 WT, supra note 94.
219. See Participant Observation-13WTr, supra note 135 (describing previous testimony
by Frau H.).
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leave by himself with the purse. The victim lives in
[another town]. Why would a person [from another
town] give a person in Rosenberg her apartment key?
That makes no sense.
We cannot believe that the defendant did not look in the
victim's purse. We also know from Herr D. that the
victim was very drunk. She probably has an alcohol
problem. We know she was pushed against the wall ...
the victim was helpless. One witness said that it was
unusual to see a person so drunk
What is the legal conclusion? The defendant pressed
the victim 's head against the floor. The victim was
very drunk. He hurt her when he pushed her against
the wall. There is the objective evidence that she had
pain, there was bleeding, and she was helpless.
However, it was not a forcible rape under Section
177.. . but a crime under Section 179 [sexual abuse of
persons incapable of resisting] .220 The taking away of
the purse constitutes robbery under Section 249.
As to the matter of culpability ... I do not understand
why the defendant did not say that he had made a
mistake, he had been drinking. The suspect was not so
drunk that he did not know what he was doing.
Because the victim was so drunk, Section 179 applies.
The minimum punishment for this crime is two years.
The normal punishment is a range between two and
fifteen years. I recommend a punishment of three
years.
After a short period of deliberation, the panel of one professional judge
and two lay judges announced their verdict. 2  The panel found the
defendant guilty of the crimes of sexual abuse of a person incapable of
220. See STGB, supra note 164, § 179 (defining the crime of sexual abuse of person
incapable of resisting). Section 179 states:
(1) Whoever abuses another person who is incapable of resisting; 1) because of
a mental or emotional illness or disability, including an addiction or because of a
profound consciousness disorder. .... Imprisonment for no less than one year
shall be imposed, if: The perpetrator completes an act of sexual intercourse or
similar sexual actions with the victim, which are combined with a penetration of
the body, or allows them to be committed on himself by the victim.
Id.
221. Participant Observation- 13 WT, supra note 135.
222. Id
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resisting as well as theft.22 3 The court immediately proceeded to sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment of two years and six months on the
ground that the minimum punishment for a charge of sexual abuse was a
two year sentence. 2 According to the court, the case qualified as a case of
serious abuse under the statute .225  For that reason, the court had the
226authority to impose a sentence totaling fifteen years of incarceration.
In this case, the prosecutor defined his role not as an advocate arguing
for a conviction on the highest possible charge but rather as a second judge
whose role was to neutrally weigh the evidence presented by the court.22
In line with his duty to weigh the evidence objectively, the prosecutor
questioned the victim whether or not she had been drinking the day of the
trial.22 While the prosecutor could have remained silent, because it was
only a matter of time before the odor of alcohol filled the courtroom, the
prosecutor's actions may have merely preempted a likely comment from the
defense or the court. Given that the prosecutor confronted the victim about
her alcohol consumption and threatened to file charges against a witness if
he did not tell the whole truth, one might be tempted to conclude that the
prosecutor adopted an independent trial strategy. By performing an
inquisitive fact finding role, the prosecutor did not function like an
interested party. However, the prosecutor's demeanor and language did not
project the image of a dispassionate fact-finder; rather, it mirrored the role
of a spokesman for the state's quest for truth.
Because the prosecutor in this case aggressively questioned the
witnesses, his trial strategy does not fall into the acquiescent category.
Based on his aggressive challenge to the victim's testimony in the case, it
might be tempting to categorize his strategy as being independent.
However, in other key respects, the prosecutor did not act in a manner that
was independent of the presiding judge. Despite the evidentiary gaps, the
prosecutor did not suggest that the court call additional witnesses to
testify.229 It is possible that one of those witnesses may have observed the
suspect use force against the victim. The prosecutor could have challenged





227. See Interview with Prosecutor-1I3WT, supra note 94 (discussing role of the
prosecutor at trial).
228. See id. (describing questioning by prosecutor).
229. Id.
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act with complete independence. His actions, by design or accident,
supported and reinforced the judge's perspective of the case. Moreover, the
prosecutor conformed to the investigating colleague's expectations, agreed
with his recommendation that the suspect should be found criminally liable,
and recommended the sentence of three years that his colleague
proposed .23 0 For these reasons, the prosecutor's strategy in this case was
largely supportive of the presiding judge's perspective of the evidence.
C Case Two: Schneekopf
The second trial involves a serious sexual abuse of a child .23'1 Because
the proceedings involved a child, I have changed many of the case's
descriptive details to further protect the victim's anonymity. In this case, a
middle aged family man was accused of sexually abusing an eleven-year-
old child.23 Prior to the incident, the suspect and the victim's family
frequently attended the same social events .233  Because the victim was a
child, prior to trial, the judge appointed an expert witness who was charged
with interviewing the victim and evaluating her credibility. 3 According to
230. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (describing the prosecutor's closing
statement in the Rosenberg case).
23 1. See Participant Observation-4AJ (Feb. 1, 2006) (describing observations from the
Schneekopf case) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Punishment for a
serious sexual abuse of a child is codified in section 1 76a of the STBG. See STGB, supra
note 164, § 1 76a (defining punishment for sexual abuse of children). Section 1 76a provides:
(1) The sexual abuse of children shall be punished with imprisonment for no less
than one year in cases under Section 176 subsections (1) and (2), if:
1. a person over eighteen years of age completes an act of sexual intercourse or
similar sexual acts with the child, which are combined with a penetration of the
body. or allows them to be conmmitted on himself by the child;
2. the act is committed jointly by more than one person;
3. the perpetrator by the act places the child in danger of serious health damage
or substantial impairment of his physical or emotional development; or
4. the perpetrator has undergone a final judgment of conviction for such a crime
within the previous five years....
(3) In less serious cases under subsection (1), imprisonment from three months
to five years shall be imposed, in less serious cases under subsection (2),
imprisonment from one year to ten years.
Id.
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the expert, the victim was telling the truth.23 While the defense attorney
hired his own expert witness, that witness did not attack the victim's
credibility but rather challenged the procedures that the court's expert used
to formulate his evaluation. 3
In contrast to the first case, a collateral attorney (Nebenkidger)
appeared in court to represent the victim's interests during the
proceedings. 3 The main proceeding began with the judge questioning the
defendant about his personal circumstances. 3 At the time of the hearing,
the defendant stated that he was thirty-five years old, happily married, and
employed in a good position with a government agency.239 After testifying
about his personal information, the defendant informed the court that he
wished to testify about the events in question .24 0 During his statement to
the court, the defendant testified that on the date of the alleged incident, he
and his wife hosted a neighborhood party where the defendant consumed
alcohol with his guests.24 Asteprty was winding down, the defendant
spotted the victim, who was a local neighbour, standing outside. 4 The
victim told him that she had lost her house key.24 Since it was too late to
go home, the defendant invited her inside his house.2 The defendant
proceeded to tell the court that his wife had asked him to sleep in the living
room because he snores after he drinks alcohol. 4 At this point in the
proceeding, the judge began to interrupt the defendant and ask specific
questions about the events in question. 4 The defendant continued to
testify, telling the court that both he and the victim slept on separate
couches in the living room.247 When they woke up in the morning, nothing
2 35. Id
2 36. Id
237. See STPO, supra note 7, § 395 (permitting a victim or the victim's personal
representative to obtain the services of a collateral prosecutor who participates in the trial as
a private prosecutor); id § 397 (allowing the private prosecutor to view the case files,
petition the court to take additional evidence, and appeal the court's judgment).
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abnormal had occurred. 4 After the defendant finished his account, the
judge gently confronted him and reminded him that he should testify
honestly.249 At this point, the prosecutor took over the questioning. 250 in
the excerpt below, the prosecutor asks the defendant about a prior allegation
made against the defendant by the victim's father.
Prosecutor: The victim 'slather said that you also touched his other
daughter's leg at a birthday party, is this true?
Defendant: I don't know.
Judge: Do you remember what happened at the birthday
party?
Defendant: I was sitting next to a girl and merely pinched her near
her waist.
Prosecutor: What clothing were you wearing when you went to
sleep?
Defendant: Boxer shorts.
Prosecutor: One of your neighbors told the police that you are
usually a friendly person except when you are drunk.
Then you try to touch women. Is this true?
Defendant: I have no reply.
Prosecutor: Did you see the victim after the night of the alleged
incident?
Defendant: No. I never talked to her about this event. My
relationship with her did not change until she talked to
her mother about it. 
25
1
After the prosecutor concluded his questioning, the collateral
prosecutor had this exchange with the defendant:
Collateral P: Was there another room in your house that the victim
could have slept in?
Defendant: No.







252. Id While this statement would undoubtedly draw an objection in an American
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At this point in the hearing, the judge announced that the court would
take a short break so that the attorneys, the prosecutor, and the presiding
professional judge could meet in the judge's chambers to discuss the
possibility of a plea. 253  In the cases that I observed, this occurred
frequently. 5 The parties then adjourned to the judge's chambers and the
defense attorney began the discussion by stating that the defendant would
only accept a punishment of less than one year .255  The defense counsel
stressed that the defendant would lose his job in the armed forces if the
defendant received a more severe sentence.25 Counsel proposed that the
defendant admit that he only touched the girl and that the court impose a
sentence of less than one year.25 Immediately, the prosecutor categorically
rejected the offer:
I cannot agree to a different criminal act because that is not what
happened in this case. The minimum penalty for this crime is two
years. It is not my job to worry about the defendant's job; the burden is
on the defendant to start a new career.25
The prosecutor's stance underscores a key difference between
American plea bargaining practices and the German practice of "confession
bargaining." In the German system, the constitutional principles of fair trial
and guil 25 impose limits on the bargaining process that aim to preserve the
key elements of an inquisitorial system's truth-finding process . 60 After this
court because it is not a question, German procedural rules permit a wider range of
questioning practices. See STPO, supra note 7, § 136a (delineating the boundaries of
questioning broadly).
253. Participant Observation-4AJ, supra note 231.
254. Id.; Participant Observation-4B1 (Feb. 3, 2006) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Participant Observation-1I3WT, supra note 135.
255. Participant Observation-4AJ, supra note 231.
2 56. Id
257. Id. A one year sentence would apply only if the court found the defendant guilty
of the less serious offense. See STGB, supra note 164, § 1 76a (mandating a minimum two-
year sentence for aggravated child abuse).
258. Participant Observation-4AJ, supra note 231.
259. See Turner, supra note 129, at 89 (explaining that criminal responsibility must be
proportionate to personal culpability under the guilt principle).
260. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 3, 2005, 50
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 40, 48 (Ger.)
(holding that plea bargains are generally permissible under German law). The German
Federal Supreme Court explained:
The defendant has a right to a fair trial based on the rule of law. The way in
which the court fulfills its duty to investigate the facts, the legal qualification of
35
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exchange, the collateral prosecutor stated that she too would not agree to
the deal because it would send a signal to the victim that the court did not
believe her.26 Moreover, the advocate reminded defense counsel that if the
defendant were to insist on going forward with the trial, the defendant could
receive a prison sentence of more than four years.26 After the defense
counsel consulted with his client, the defendant rejected the deal. 6
At this point in the case, in a private conversation, the prosecutor
related to me that, because the defendant's testimony had been so
inconsistent, it was likely that the defendant had lied .264 Ironically, when
the victim in the case took the stand it quickly became apparent that her
testimony was also problematic. In response to open-ended questioning
from the court, the victim testified initially that she had simply fallen asleep
on the couch and then woke up the next morning2 6 The judge then shifted
to a more focused, but still gentle, questioning technique attempting to prod
266
the victim forward by reading excerpts from the victim's prior statement.
While the victim then confirmed her initial allegations, she then alleged that
the defendant had actually penetrated her.26 In her prior statement, the
victim had maintained that the defendant had only touched her private
parts. 6 The judge greeted this new allegation with skepticism and told the
victim that this new revelation will make the court's decision difficult.269
The judge specifically told the victim: "We must determine what
the offense, and the principles of sentencing cannot be left to arbitrariness or to
the unfettered disposition of the parties and the court. Therefore the court and
the prosecutor are not allowed to engage in a settlement in the guise of a verdict
or to barter with justice....
A central goal of a criminal process conducted under the rule of law is the
ascertainment of the true facts as the necessary foundation for a just verdict.
The examination of the facts by the trial court is governed by the requirement
"to clarify the facts in the best possible manner"; this requirement is inherent in
§ 244 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Constitution.
Id.
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happened. There are two possibilities. First, nothing more happened than
you said before. Second, the defendant's actions went further."'0
After the prosecutor and collateral attorney concluded questioning the
victim, the defendant's attorney submitted his questions to the judge who,
under German law, decided which questions she would pose to the
victim.27 ' In addition, the judge may decide whether the other attorneys
may directly question the victim.2 72 In some jurisdictions, the prosecutor,
collateral prosecutor, and the defense attorney will type the questions that
they would like the court to pose to the victim into a computer. 7
However, if a judge refuses to pose a question requested by one of the
attorneys, the refusal may create an appellate issue.27 Even in cases
involving adult victims, the judge is obliged to intervene to stop the cross-
275examination if the attorney's interrogation becomes too aggressive.
The challenge of finding the truth increased when the facts in the
victim's testimony shifted on the stand. One of the two lay judges actually
began to shake her head as the victim was testifying. 7 After the victim's
testimony concluded, the court announced another break.27 At this point,
the prosecutor related to me: "I am no longer convinced that the defendant
is guilty. The victim has told three different versions of what
happened .... This latest allegation is completely new. .... I cannot argue
that the suspect is guilty unless I am convinced that the allegations are
true.",27 1 When the proceedings resumed, the judge read out loud a section
of the Code of Criminal Procedure in open court, which detailed the
potential penalties that the defendant would face if he was convicted in the
2 70. Id.
271. In cases involving the testimony of children under the age of sixteen, the judge
screens the defense attorney's questions and then may decide which questions will be
permitted as well as whether the judge or the defense attorney shall pose those questions to
the child. See STPO, supra note 7, § 241a (granting the judge the authority to screen
potential questions posed to witnesses under the age of sixteen).
272. See id. (granting the presiding judge discretion to allow direct questioning by
attorneys).
273. See Interview with Prosecutor-8AR, supra note 117 (describing the process for
interviewing children).
274. See id. (noting that a defense attorney can challenge a refusal to pose a question in
an appeal).
275. See STPO, supra note 7, § 241(2) (allowing the presiding judge to reject an
inappropriate or irrelevant question).
276. Participant Observation-4M, supra note 231.
2 77. Id.
278. Interview with Prosecutor-4AJ (confidential interview) (Feb. 1, 2006) (emphasis
added) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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district court (Landgericht).7 In choosing to do so, it seemed clear that the
judge was trying to suggest that the defendant confess. If the defendant
elected to seek a retrial at the higher court level, he could have faced a
sentence that exceeded four years of imprisonment. Because the current
local court (Amtsgericht) was limited to imposing a sentence of less than
four years, the judge had hinted that it would be a wise decision for the
defendant to confess .280 The defendant and his counsel left the courtroom
to once again discuss the possibility of a confession agreement .2 18 ' During
the break the prosecutor related to me: "I am still concerned about whether
the victim is telling the truth or not. Now it is apparent that she told the
psychologist that she had never injured herself and yet on the stand she
testified that she had injured herself. There are too many
incnsitecie. ,82The judge then called the prosecutor into her chambers
and asked him what he thought about the evidence so far.28 Because the
judge had subtly suggested that the defendant confess, it was evident by this
point that the judge was leaning towards convicting the defendant. Despite
that fact, the prosecutor informed the court that he could not argue that the
defendant was guilty.284  The prosecutor's potential pursuit of an
279. Participant Observation-4AJ, supra note 231. The Landgericht is above the
Amtsgericht. See GVG, supra note 74, § 12 (outlining the jurisdictions of the various
German courts).
280. The jurisdiction of the Amtsgericht is specified in sections 21 and 24 of the
German Code on Court Constitution, while the jurisdiction of the Landgericht is specified in
section 74. See generally GVG, supra note 74, §§ 21-21j, 24, 74-74f (regulating the
jurisdictions of the Amtsgericht and the Landgericht). It is currently an undecided issue in
German law as to whether rape cases may be filed directly into the Landgericht or regional
court bypassing the local court (Amtsgericht). Participant Observation-4AJ, supra note 23 1.
The prosecutor who tried the case told me that he would have filed the case directly into the
Landgericht and that the prosecutor who initially filed the case in the local court may have
made that choice because it was easier for him to do so. Id. However, filing the case in the
local court places an extra burden on the victim. Because defendants in local court
(Amtsgerichr) cases have the right to a de novo appeal, the victim may have to testify in two
proceedings. Id Regional Court (Landgericht) trials typically take longer than local court
(Amtsgericht) proceedings as the court is likely to take testimony from all of the available
witnesses. Id. The reason for this is that there is only one level of appeal from cases heard
at the regional court (Landgericht) level-an appeal to the Federal Criminal Court
challenging legal issues in the case. Id
281. Participant Observation-4J, supra note 231.
282. Interview with Prosecutor-4MJ, supra note 278.
283. Participant Observation-4AJ. supra note 23 1.
284. Id.
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independent trial strategy drew a look of concern on the judge's face and
the meeting ended. 8
After the defendant and his attorney returned to the court room, the
defense attorney stated that his client wanted the trial to continue. 8 At this
point, the prosecutor requested that the court take the testimony of the
victim's teacher. 8 By suggesting that the court call an additional witness
to the stand, the prosecutor took an affirmative step towards clarify'ing the
facts in the case and playing a potentially independent truth-finding role.
On the stand, the teacher testified that the victim had approached her
after class one day crying.28 When she asked the victim what was wrong,
the victim told her that her neighbor had sexually touched her .289 This new
evidence corroborated the victim's initial account of the incident and
appeared to tip the scales against the defendant.
After this witness departed from the stand, the collateral prosecutor
directly addressed the defendant in open court informing him that, in her
opinion, the witness was extremely credible .290  The victim advocate
proceeded to tell the defendant that, the longer the trial lasted, the more it
would traumatize the victim.29 1 In closing, she suggested to the defendant
that continuing to call the victim a liar would further traumatize the
victim.292 These comments highlighted the collateral prosecutor's role as a
party acting on the victim's behalf and led the defense attorney to request a
meeting in the judicial chambers. 9 The judge began the meeting by
stating outright that he believed the defendant was guilty.294 In contrast to
the American plea bargaining process, in which the judge merely confirms
or rejects an agreement negotiated between the prosecution and the defense,
the court's leadership role in the "confession bargaining" process represents
a distinct difference between the roles of the players in the two systems.
Since the presiding judge structures the presentation of evidence and
dominates the questioning process, the presiding judge has a stake in
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collateral prosecutor and the presiding judge who exerted pressure on the
defendant to confess .295 That pressure eventually swayed the defendant.
After a discussion between all of the participants, everyone settled on a
recommended sentence of two years of probation. 9 When the parties
returned to court, the defendant admitted that he had abused the victim.
297
Consistent with German practice, the admission was accepted as part of the
trial testimony itself rather than as the basis for a free-standing plea
hearing.29 The confession was followed by the attorneys' closing
statements. In his closing, the prosecutor complied with his statutory duty
to cite the factors that weighed both in favor as well as against the
defendant by stating:
The range of sentences for this charge is from 2 to 15 years. I
recommend two years of probation. On the one hand, the crime is
severe. On the other hand, because the defendant has admitted
committing the crime, he can get treatment .... The defendant has two
children of his own. In addition, he is going to lose his job as well as his
pension.... There were also problems with the victim's account of
what happened. We heard different versions of the story. 
299
After the final arguments concluded, the presiding judge retired to
"deliberate"t with the two lay judges .300 Theoretically, the lay judges could
have outvoted the professional judge and refused to accept the
agreement .30 1 Nevertheless, when the judges returned to the court room, the
presiding judge announced that the defendant had been found guilty and
that the court had decided to impose a two year suspended sentence with
certain other conditions. 0
What does prosecutorial objectivity mean in this case? First, on the
basis of the prosecutor's questioning, it appears that the prosecutor tested
the credibility of both the victim and the defendant. In this respect, the







301. See Machura, supra note 144, at 461-63 (arguing that consensual norms between
lay and professional judges make it unlikely that lay jurors will vote against the professional
judges).
302. Participant Observation-4AJ, supra note 23 1.
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truth. 0 Second, while the prosecutor did not serve as the victim's
advocate, he was not the defendant's advocate either. Although he
privately voiced his doubts to the presiding judge and collateral prosecutor,
he did not voice his doubts publicly until a deal had been struck.3
Interestingly, the collateral prosecutor was the driving force behind the
deal. The presence of the collateral party, in effect, enabled the prosecutor
to remain neutral. It was the collateral prosecutor, as well as the presiding
judge, who continued to confront the defendant in order to sway the
defendant to admit his guilt.305  During the trial, the prosecutor and the
judge disagreed as to whether the evidentiary burden had been satisfied. 0
The corroborating testimony of the teacher enabled the collateral prosecutor
and the judge to push the defendant towards a confession. It was a
confession that came with a reduced sentence of probation rather than
imprisonment. 0 This reduction in sentence is common in rape cases
adjudicated in German courts when witness credibility is at issue.
308
The dynamic of the proceeding is an interesting one that calls into
question the ability of analysts to draw bright line distinctions between the
roles played by the different actors in the case. While the judge hinted that
the defendant could face a higher imprisonment level if he insisted on
pursuing the case further, the collateral prosecutor continued to stress the
trauma that the process was causing the victim.309 During this exchange,
the prosecutor stayed on the sidelines.3t Once the negotiations over the
deal had commenced, however, the prosecutor set a bottom-line for the
sentence which cost the defendant his employment. 1 It would have been
interesting to see whether the prosecutor would have actually recommended
an acquittal had the trial continued. In essence, while the prosecutor
viewed the evidence through an objective lens, he stayed in the background
while other participants steered the trial towards an agreement. He did,






308. See Interview with Prosecutor-13WT, supra note 94 (noting that rape cases often
weigh the victim's word against the defendant's word-making it difficult to be certain who
is telling the truth).
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convinced that sufficient evidence existed to show guilt.312  When an
agreement was in sight, the prosecutor represented the state and the law's
interest by refusing to redefine the crime to allow the defendant to protect
his job.31 Although the prosecutor acted independently of the presiding
judge throughout most of the main proceeding, when the scales of
credibility tipped towards the victim, the prosecutor joined in confirming
the confession agreement.
While the prosecutor pursued an independent strategy, one could argue
that the role played by the collateral prosecutor both created the space that
allowed him to voice his doubts as well as narrowed his decision-making
options once the collateral prosecutor and the judge convinced the
defendant to confess. It is not clear, however, in what sense the trial
represented an objective search for the truth. The active role that the
presiding judge played in trying to effectuate a deal raises a question as to
whether the judge's desire to conclude the case colored his objectivity.
From the prosecutor's perspective, "confession agreements" may be
seen not merely as time-saving, but also as a means of reducing evidentiary
uncertainty. 1 When the evidence presented in the courtroom is
indeterminate, a prosecutor who is charged with the duty to view that
evidence through an "objective" rather than adversarial lens may be in a
more uncertain decision-making position. While a prosecutor in an
adversarial system may simply argue for a conviction and leave the
outcome up to the jury, the decision-making posture of German prosecutors
is more ambiguous. As one prosecutor in a money-laundering trial related
to me, "conflicts in witness testimony make me uncomfortable." 1 ' By
agreeing to a "confession agreement," a prosecutor can minimize the
uncertainty of the fact-finding process created by evidence that is
conflicted. Although the suspect's confession may confirm the suspect's
guilt, that level of guilt may be diminished. In essence, the confession may
be viewed as a move towards the truth, but it is not necessarily "the truth."
In this light, a prosecutor is willing to accept a confession agreement when
the degree of movement towards the truth outweighs the degree of guilt
confirmed by the sentence. Viewed from this perspective, these agreements
do not necessarily short-circuit the truth-finding process, but rather help the




315. Interview with Prosecutor-5DK, supra note 137.
1342
UNCERTAINTY AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTHA T TRIAL 14
backdrop, the interrelationships between the courtroom actors not only
affects the delivery of justice but also delineates the extent to which the
truth-finding process is an objective one.
D. Case Three: Strehlen 3 16
In this final case, the interrelationships between the presiding judge
and the defense attorneys complicated the prosecutor's Willingness to
perform a robust fact-finding role in the courtroom. Moreover, as in the
Rosenberg case, the trial prosecutor did not supervise the investigation
conducted in the case.31 These factors dramatically shaped the
courtroom's decision-making dynamic.
In 2008, the state charged two eighteen-year-old young men for
seriously abusing a child under the age of fourteen-a major crime
(Verbrechen) under German law .318  In contrast to the other case-studies
discussed in this Article, which took place in lower (Amtsgericht)
courtrooms, 1 the investigating prosecutor filed this case in the regional
court (Landgericht) .32 0  Although regional court panels usually contain
three professional judges and two lay judges, the presiding judge turned the
case over to a smaller panel and appointed a less experienced colleague to
serve as the presiding judge .3 21 As will become apparent, the judge's
inexperience and personality complicated the truth-finding process as the
judge lacked the requisite skill necessary to question the key witness in the
316. Strehien is a fictitious name that I have assigned to a city where the proceeding
was held.
317. Participant Observation-1I3WT, supra note 135.
318. Id According to section 1 76a, the minimum punishment is a term of
imprisonment no less than one year; the maximum punishment is ten years of imprisonment.
See STGB, supra note 164, § 1 76a (promulgating sentencing guidelines for child abuse).
319. The Amtsgericht cases are tried in front of a judicial panel comprised of one
professional and two lay judges. See GVG, supra note 74, §§ 28, 29 (mandating the
inclusion of lay judges in local courts that decide criminal matters).
320. Participant Observation-4B1, supra note 254.
321. See id. German procedural law permits a smaller panel of Landgericht judges to
hear less serious cases. See GVG, supra note 74, § 76(2) (providing that the chief judge may
decide, at the beginning of the main proceedings, whether it will be composed of only two
judges unless the participation of a third judge appears necessary due to the scale or
complexity of the case).
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case-the victim. 322  In addition, the two defense attorneys adopted a
combative trial strategy that was more reflective of adversarial trials. 
323
As the case file arrived before the court, it was evident to the trial
prosecutor that the investigation had been hastily performed. 2 As I
learned from the prosecutor who handled the trial, the prosecutor assigned
to the case at the investigation stage had been about to go on maternity
leave when the alleged rape occurred .32 ' Rather than send the case to a
colleague to complete the investigation, the prosecutor elected to file
charges without requesting DNA testing of the evidence or ordering that a
psychologist evaluate the victim's credibility. 2 According to the trial
prosecutor, the original prosecutor had expected that the judge would order
the DNA testing as well as the psychological evaluation if necessary.32
By the time the trial reached its second day, the uncertain nature of the
victim's testimony, as well as the conflict between the presiding judge and
the defense attorneys created an uncharacteristically contentious trial. It
had become apparent to both the prosecution and the defense by the second
day of trial that the evidence presented in court so far had been inadequate
to establish the defendants' guilt. Thus, a key issue put to debate in the
trial's second day was whether or not the trial court should order that the
state complete additional investigation in the case.
328
As the second day of trial began, the defense called into question the
victim's credibility by highlighting differences between the victim's
original statement to the police and her testimony on the stand. 2 On the
night of the alleged rape, the victim told the police that two young men had
climbed into her open bedroom window. 3 While one of the unknown
suspects threatened her with a gun, the other suspect raped her. 33 1 On the
322. Participant Observation-4B1, supra note 254.
323. Id. Although prosecutors and judges acknowledge that defendants have a right to
an attorney under German law, many of them look on the so-called "conflict defense
attorneys" (Konfliktverteidiger) with disdain. See Interview with Prosecutor-lI3WT, supra
note 94 (noting that these attorneys are "bad lawyer[s]" whose clients receive a "higher
punishment"). As one prosecutor related to me, "the defense counsel's job is to secure a
confession." Id.
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stand however, the victim testified that only one young man had entered her
room and that she had previously met that young man at a party.33
Complicating the fact-finding process further was the fact that the initial
interview conducted by a police officer was replete with leading questions
and answers in which the victim essentially confirmed verbatim the
wording of the officer's questions. 3
The inconsistency in the victim's testimony was not the only reason
that the truth-finding process at trial proved to be difficult. During trial, the
victim's parents admitted that the victim had been previously hospitalized
several times for mental health issues. 3 Had the investigating prosecutor
petitioned the court to order a psychological exam of the victim, the court
and the prosecutor would have had additional expert insight into the
victim's credibility. 35  As the trial continued, the factual uncertainty
increased. The next witness, who was the victim's close fiend, testified
that both she and the victim had conducted a seance after the alleged rape in
which a ghost appeared and told the victim that she had not been raped.33
The testimony of the two defendants was also problematic. While one
of the defendants testified that he had in fact slept with the victim, he
claimed that the sex was consensual."' 7 Although the second defendant
denied having had sex with the victim, when the police searched his
bedroom, they found a gun that the victim identified as having been used in
the rape.33 The available forensic evidence could not settle the testimonial
uncertainty. Although the victim had been examined by hospital personnel
immediately following the incident and her medical exam had showed
evidence of trauma, by the time of the trial, neither the prosecutor's office
nor the court had ordered the forensic lab to test the DNA evidence
collected during the exam.33
In response to the inconsistent evidence revealed during the
proceeding, both defense attorneys moved the court to appoint a
3 32. Id.
3 33. Id
334. See Interview with Prosecutor-4BI (confidential interview) (Feb. 3, 2006) (noting
that the victim had been hospitalized in a psychiatric facility four times) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
335. Participant Observation-4BI, supra note 254.
336. Id.
337. Interview with Prosecutor-4B1, supra note 334.
338. Participant Observation-4BI, supra note 254.
339. Id.
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psychologist to evaluate the victim's credibility. 34 0  According to a
prosecutor who deals with sexual crime cases in another office, expert
witnesses are routinely used to assist the court in evaluating the victim's
credibility:
[With sexual crimes involving children] it is the task of the expert
witness to investigate whether or not the child has been exposed to
suggestive influences. . ... There are many possibilities which must be
properly investigated. .... I have also seen expert opinions where the
expert states that there has been so many statements that the expert can
no longer discern what the truth is. 
341
Although the trial prosecutor confided to me that he would have
petitioned the court to appoint an expert psychologist on the case had he
supervised the case investigation 34 ' he took no position in open court on
the defense motion. 4 His inaction on the discovery request fell far short of
a dedicated pursuit of the truth.
The defense also requested that the court order the forensic laboratory
to test the evidence collected at the scene and from the VitM.4
Complying with this request was well within the power of the court.
According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, when it becomes apparent
during the main proceeding that the investigation conducted by the
prosecution is insufficient, a court is free to extend the taking of evidence
"in order to establish the trth . .. to all facts and means of proof relevant to
the decision." 345 Moreover, this provision grants the court the authority to
summon witnesses and experts who were not interviewed during the case
investigation process. 4 Under German law, both the prosecutor, as well as
the defense counsel, possess the right to petition the court to hear the
testimony of additional witnesses. 4 The prosecutor failed to support this
motion as well.34
340. Id
341. Interview with Prosecutor-5CK (confidential interview) (Jan. 22, 2006) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
342. See Interview with Prosecutor-4B1, supra note 334 ("1 would have ordered an
expert report on the victim.").
343. Participant Observation-4B1, supra note 254.
344. Id.
345. STPO, supra note 7, § 244(2).
346. See id (allowing the court to take any evidence necessary to reach a decision).
347. See id § 245(2) (obliging the court to extend the taking of evidence to witnesses
summoned by the defendant or prosecutor).
348. Participant Observation-4BI, supra note 254.
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The defense argument regarding the two motions provoked a
contentious exchange between defense counsel and the presiding judge. 4
As the prosecutor remained silent, the presiding judge denied both motions
and stated that it was obvious that there was no need to take further
evidence to render a verdict .350  The judge then closed the proceeding's
evidentiary phase and announced a short break .3 5'1 During the break, the
judge pulled the prosecutor aside and informed him that he should prepare
to make his closing argument. 5 Ironically, the prosecutor did object to the
judge at this point as the clock approached 7:00 p.m. 353  This objection
however drew the curt response from the judge to the effect that "he
[should] start living in the real world. 3
54
Prior to the reading of the court's verdict, I asked the prosecutor
whether or not he believed that the victim's testimony was sufficiently
credible to recommend that the court convict both defendants. The
prosecutor responded: "I believe her [the victim] but only in a small part
because there are so many inconsistencies. 3 55 The prosecutor further
explained to me:
I am only sixty percent convinced that the second defendant is guilty. I
have been thinking about my closing argument and I am having
difficulty reaching a "certain" decision because the victim's statements
are inconsistent. This is only the second time in my fifteen[-]year career
that I am not satisfied with the evidence presented during the main
proceeding .... The maximum sentence available against both
defendants is four years. They are both very young. I think I will
recommend a sentence of four years for both defendants. I think that the
Federal Criminal Court will overturn the decision in any case ... I have
a bad feeling in my gut about this case. Although there is uncertainty,
there is not enough uncertainty to recommend that the court acquit the
defendants ... I believe at the center of the case is a truth but around
the center are inconsistencies. I wish that we had had an expert report in
the case on the subject of the victim's truthfulness. 35
6
In this case, it appeared that the decisions made during the







355. Interview with Prosecutor-4B31, supra note 334.
356. Participant Observation-4BI, supra note 254.
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prosecutor's conduct.35 In particular, neither the judge nor the prosecutor
was inclined to stop the proceedings to allow more evidence to be
collected. 5 While the judge was convinced that the evidence presented
during the trial was sufficient, the prosecutor was more equivocal; he
merely wished that he could rely on an expert witness's report. 5
Moreover, the prosecutor recommended that the court convict both
defendants and impose a prison sentence despite the fact that he was not
fully convinced of their guilt. 360 While he doubted the reliability of some of
the testimony, he was also confident that the higher court would overturn
the convictions .36' That result, however, would have imposed an additional
cost on the victim. A new trial would have forced the victim to testify a
second time.
In this case, the trial prosecutor's decision-making could be
categorized as an acquiescent strategy. Although the trial highlighted gaps
in the investigation, the prosecutor was unwilling to support the defense
attorneys' requests to supplement those gaps.36 While the prosecutor who
handled the case at trial had the advantage of viewing the evidence through
fresh eyes, the prosecutor's timidity in confronting the court and his
unwillingness to side with the opinion voiced by conflict-oriented defense
attorneys led him to acquiesce to the opinion of the presiding judge. 6
Rather than take the initiative to challenge the court's opinion,3 ~ his
commitment to objectivity was relegated to merely hoping that the appellate
court would overturn the decision. In this case, the prosecutor's allegiance
to informal collegial controls and his acquiescence to the presiding judge's
courtroom decisions suggest that, under certain conditions, some
prosecutors may be reluctant to perform a robust fact-finding role in the
courtroom.
Although German law envisions that courts will aggressively pursue
the truth at trial through a full examination of the evidence, 6 that truth-
357. Unfortunately, as of this date, I have been unable to discover the outcome of the
case from either the prosecution or the defense.







365. See STPO, supra note 7, § 244 (establishing a process that culminates in a full
presentation of evidence in a court proceeding).
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finding process was certainly short-circuited in this case. The confluence of
dynamic relational forces between the investigating and trial prosecutors,
between the presiding judge and defense counsel, and between the
prosecutor and the presiding judge, handicapped the search for truth.
Concomitantly, a series of unique circumstances created a decision-making
dynamic that was far different from the process of constructive compromise
reflected in the Schneekopf case.36 Those circumstances included the fact
that the initial prosecutor on the case had filed the charges prematurely
because she was leaving on maternity leave. 6 Due to the chief judge's
decision not to participate in the case, a less experienced judge, who had
difficulty managing the proceeding, directed the proceeding. 368 The two
defendants were represented by attorneys who elected to pursue a conflict-
oriented strategy. 69 Finally, the prosecutor's last argument to the court
assumed the character of a hedged bet. While he recommended that the
court convict the defendants, he fervently hoped that the higher court would
overturn the conviction.1370 The prosecutor's acquiescent strategy did
nothing to countermand the direction of a truth-finding process that fell
short of a thorough investigation of the facts.
.Ultimately this case underscores the fluid and contextual nature of the
evidence-weighing process. The interrelationships between the parties
involved in the case strongly impacted the case outcome. The prosecutor's
decision-making process seemed calculated to preserve the prosecutor's
relationship with the presiding judge, rather than to preserve the system's
commitment to finding the truth. It is certain that the prosecutor did not act
as a truly independent second judge; rather the prosecutor chose to speak
out in favor of a conviction despite questionable decision-making by the
presiding judge .3 7' The prosecutor's decision to recommend that the court
find the defendants guilty was far removed from a detached weighing of the
facts and the law and, instead, underscored the interdependence of the
prosecutorial and judicial fuinctions. The case raises questions as to
whether the prosecutorial and judicial branches can truly function
366. Participant Observation-4AJ, supra note 231.
367. Participant Observation-4BI, supra note 254.
368. See Interview with Prosecutor-4111, supro note 334 (noting that the presiding
judge's inexperience and lack of training).
369. Participant Observation-41, supra note 254.
370. See Interview with Prosecutor-4BI, supra note 334 (noting that the judge's
inexperience and lack of special training and that the prosecutor's belief that the decision
would be overturned enabled him to recommend a conviction).
3 71. Id
349
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independently as well as the extent to which trial prosecutors are willing to
correct mistakes made by the investigating prosecutor. In order to act in a
manner that evidenced a stronger commitment to supporting a full
investigation of the victim's allegation, the prosecutor would have had to
adopt a more confrontational tone against the presiding judge. That
strategy could have compromised the prosecutor's relationship with his
colleague as well as with the presiding judge and violated unwritten norms
of collegiality between judges and prosecutors. More problematic was the
fact that by joining in the defense motions, the prosecutor would have had
to violate a clear norm against cooperating with conflict-oriented defense
attorneys. 7
V. Conclusion: The Relational Construction of Prosecutorial Objectivity
The face of objectivity in German courtrooms is both constitutive and
relational. According to German law, prosecutors possess a duty to conduct
an objective investigation while trial courts are bound to ensure that all
evidence that is necessary to discover the truth is presented at trial.37
Ideally, the presiding judge serves as a check on the prosecutor's decisions
during the investigation stage, while the prosecutor serves as a check on
judicial decision-making at trial. Although German law posits that the
prosecutor and the court function as independent organs of justice, 374 a
372. When I asked prosecutors what the role of the defense attorney was, many
prosecutors criticized defense attorneys who adopted a confrontational courtroom style. As
one prosecutor explained to me:
I think it's good to be aggressive, if you feel that there's a chance for you at the
end that the judge thinks that, "Okay, maybe he hasn't committed the crime."
That's okay. it is the task of [a] good defense attorney. But in cases where you
have a defense attorney that makes mistakes and I think he is not a bad one but
you see I think in those cases then we help him. We say let us do it this way, it
is better for the client and if he says okay I think you are right. Then I think it's
no problem if you have a bad lawyer. But I think as I told you, these cases, if
there's a case, for example. Rape is a typical case. In rape, you have to see at the
beginning of a trial if you are a good defense attorney, you have to [look at] this
case [and ask] what should you do? Then I think it's better for you to say,
"Okay, my client's guilty but you have to tell the reasons he did what he did."
But sometimes the lawyer is not good then they blame the victim, the victim was
guilty and then you are aggressive against them. I think judges, that is not okay.
I think you get a higher punishment.
Interview with Prosecutor-l13WAT, supra note 94.
373. See STPO, supra note 7, § 244(2) (mandating that courts take all evidence
necessary to establish the truth).
374. See GVG, supra note 74, § 150 (commanding public prosecution offices to operate
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desire to achieve consensus affects the interrelationship between the two
institutions at trial. Because the two institutions function in an
interdependent manner, through their courtroom decision-making,
prosecutors are more likely to support or acquiesce to judicial decision-
making. As a result, trial outcomes are a function of a "relational dance"
between the judge and the prosecutor and the other parties involved in the
case. Although the institutions of the prosecution and the judiciary are
separated on paper, my research demonstrates that they often dance
together. In this respect, my research confirms Grande's characterization of
Continental procedure as a "rumba" dance "in which many dancers of
different capacities dance together in the common enterprise of discovering
the truth.0 7 1
While prosecutors and judges play interdependent roles, that
interdependence does not completely handcuff prosecutorial decision-
making at trial. As these three cases illustrate, individual prosecutors
interpret the principle of objectivity differently.176  That difference
manifests itself in the courtroom decisions that prosecutors make. Whether
a prosecutor chooses to adopt an acquiescent, supportive, or independent
strategy towards the presiding judge, those decisions help not only to shape
case outcomes in the criminal justice system, but also to determine how the
extent to which the truth-finding process mirrors the normative ideal of
neutrality.
For comparison purposes, I have summarized the key characteristics of
the three cases below. In the Rosenberg case, while the prosecutor played a
neutral role and challenged the credibility of several of the witnesses, his
view of the evidence in the case ultimately coincided with the presiding
judge's vision .377 Although he appeared to play the role of the "bad cop"
towards courtroom witnesses, in the end, the prosecutor and court agreed on
the case disposition .3 78 Together, the presiding judge and the prosecutor in
that case dominated the trial process and guided the trial's outcome. 7
independently of the courts).
375. Grande, supra note 65, at 155.
376. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the Rosenberg case and arguing that the
prosecutor's strategy was supportive); Part MVC (discussing the Schneekopf case in the
context of the "confession agreements' prosecutorial strategy); Part IV.D (discussing the
Strehien case in the context of the "acquiescent" prosecutorial strategy).
377. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text (explaining that the prosecutor
took a neutral role in questioning witnesses but also that his strategy was largely supportive
of the presiding judge's view of the evidence).
3 78. Id
379. See supra Part IV (discussing the roles of the prosecutor and the presiding judge in
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In contrast, in the Schneekopf and Strehien trials, the assessment of the
evidence made by the prosecutors and the presiding judges differed. 
3 10
Although the prosecutors in both cases possessed varying levels of doubt
about whether a conviction was warranted, neither prosecutor openly
challenged the court's decision-making. 38'1 The dynamic of both cases
differed considerably. In the Schneekopf case, the presiding judge reached
out to the prosecutor to determine his opinion of the evidence, and the
prosecutor responded by voicing his doubts.38 In essence, the collateral
prosecutor resolved the disagreement between the prosecutor and the judge
by pushing for a "confession agreement. 3 83 Ironically, it was the actions of
an interested party working on the victim's behalf and the acquiescence of
defense counsel that led to the case's cooperative resolution. Despite his
doubts about the case, however, the prosecutor was not willing to hand over
the store to reach an agreement. 8 He insisted on a sentence that would
cost the defendant his employment and pension .385 Absent an activist
collateral prosecutor, it is likely that the prosecutor would have
recommended that the court acquit the defendant.
Finally, in the Strehien case, neither the court, nor the prosecutor took
the steps necessary to supplement the evidence presented in court when it
386became apparent that the victim's credibility was open to question.
While the prosecutor had doubts about the case, he recommended a
conviction hoping that an appellate court would overturn it.387 Although the
defense attorneys in the case petitioned the court to supplement the case
investigation, the prosecutor failed to support that motion. 8 Through his
the Rosenberg case).
380. See supra Part IV.C (describing how the prosecutor informed the judge-who
believed that the defendant was guilty-that he could not argue the defendant was guilty in
the Schneekopf case); supra Part IV.D (explaining that the prosecutor had doubts about the
credibility of the evidence while the judge was convinced of the credibility in Strehien).
381. See supra Part IV.C (describing how the prosecutor had serious doubts about the
case, which seemed to diminish after he listened to the suspect's explanation of the event,
and how, in the end, the prosecutor merely acquiesced to the collateral prosecutor's effort to
force a plea); Part IV.D (describing how the prosecutor requested a psychologist to evaluate
the victim's credibility).
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acquiescence the prosecutor did not attempt to navigate an intermediate
truth-finding path that might have dampened the impact of the defense
attorneys' aggressive, conflict-provoking strategy or the presiding judge's
inexperience.
Figure 1.0 summarizes the strategies implemented by the various
players in these cases.































In each of these cases, the evidence presented in court did not present
a clear picture of guilt. The malleability of facts and memory, which occurs
regularly in sexual assault cases, shapes the fact-finding process at trial. In
all three cases, victim interview evidence that appeared reliable during the
case investigation stage morphed into inconsistent memories at trial.38 In
two of the cases, the prosecutor responded to that uncertainty by
affirmatively questioning the witnesses in an attempt to pin down the
truth.39 In the third case, where the evidentiary uncertainty was perhaps
389. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (explaining that the victim had
conflicting statements about the use of force in Rosenberg); note 265 and accompanying text
(pointing to inconsistencies in the victim's testimony in Schneekopl); note 328 and
accompanying text (pointing to inconsistencies in the victim's testimony and her statement
to the police in Strehien).
390. See supra notes 265-72 (describing the questioning of the victim in Schneekopf);
note 228 and accompanying text (describing the prosecutor's questioning of the victim in
Rosenberg).
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the highest of the three cases, the prosecutor took no affirmative step to
reduce that uncertainty and, in fact, recommended that the court convict the
defendants .39 1  The level of evidentiary uncertainty that prosecutors are
willing to tolerate and still proffer a conviction recommendation obviously
varies. The fact that some German prosecutors do indeed wrestle with the
truth at trial shows that, in major crime cases, German prosecutors take
their commitment to serve as objective fact-finders seriously. Further
empirical research will be necessary to identify both the degree as well as
the extent to which prosecutors evidence a commitment to objectivity at
trial. This Article has merely opened the door to that inquiry.
The degree of that commitment varies substantially. While it would be
imprudent to draw broad conclusions based on the excerpts of only three
trials, it is clear that the parameters of prosecutors' role in the truth-finding
process are drawn not only by the law, but also by the beliefs of individual
prosecutors about the scope of their duty. Although I did not personally
observe a case in which a prosecutor recommended that a court acquit a
defendant, my interview data indicated that such cases do exist. 392 Several
prosecutors related to me that in the course of their careers, they had
participated in trials in which their opinion of the evidence shifted
dramatically. 9 With few exceptions, every prosecutor that I interviewed
could proudly point to a case in which they personally had recommended an
acquittal or filed an appeal on the defendant's behalf 394 Although that
anecdotal evidence falls short of conclusive proof, it suggests that
prosecutors' duty of objectivity is part of the organizational norms.
Although this Article has explored the impact collegial norms play in
restricting a prosecutor's decision-making freedom, the control over
prosecutor's decision-making at trial exercised by supervisors must be
addressed in future research.39
391. See Part IV.D (describing the prosecutor's inaction in the Strehien case).
392. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-8AR, supra note 117 (asserting that, on
multiple occasions, she has asked for acquittal because she was unconvinced of the
defendant's guilt).
393. See, e.g., id (asserting that, on multiple occasions, she has asked for acquittal
because she was unconvinced of the defendant's guilt); Interview with Prosecutor-6SB,
supra note 117 (stating that a colleague had twice filed appeals arguing for a lower
sentence).
394. See, e.g., Interview with Prosecutor-8AR, supra note 117 (asserting that she will
ask for acquittal if she is unconvinced of the defendant's guilt and has done so on multiple
occasions).
395. A preliminary impression is that prosecutors possess wide decision-making
latitude at trial. For example, one law student who was completing her practical training in a
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The face of objectivity is not merely the product of organizational
norms. An individual prosecutor's self-image is a key factor that
determines whether a prosecutor is simply content to remain on the
sidelines during the truth-finding process. When I asked one senior
prosecutor to describe the characteristics of an ideal prosecutor, he
responded:
[Y]ou must reflect about what you do. [You must ask] what will be the
effect of your accusation on the accused? What will be the impact on
the social situation of the accused? ... Prosecutors have a clear self-
understanding .... Naturally, the personality of the prosecutor, whether
they are active in the main proceeding, [is important]. There are also
those who make no comments and do not talk. On the other hand it is
also true that the judge will sometimes also [take] a difficult [position].
One would like those who represent [themselves] well in court [by
presenting] the state's view of the law and [reflecting on] the personality
of the suspect. 396
These cases demonstrate that, despite the fact that judges structure the
presentation of evidence during the main proceeding, prosecutors may
influence trial outcomes. There is a wide variation in the approaches that
particular prosecutors adopt when assessing the credibility of testimonial
evidence. In particular, prosecutors interpret their duty to investigate the
facts differently. As a result, while prosecutors possess the ability to
actively participate in the truth-finding process by directly questioning
witnesses and requesting that the court obtain additional evidence, they may
also elect to stand in the background and play an inconsequential role.
When a prosecutor elects to play an acquiescent role at trial, that passivity
cannot be equated with neutrality. In Germany's nonadversarial system,
finding the "objective truth" requires that prosecutors make an affirmative
commitment to discovering the truth.
When the evidence presented at trial is inconsistent, prosecutors'
individual comfort zones with uncertainty vary. Admittedly, the impact of
the choices that prosecutors make at trial may be less significant than the
influence that they exert during the investigation stage. Nevertheless, the
prosecutor's office told me that her supervisor would not allow her to argue for an acquittal
in a hit and run case where the key witness testified that he had not seen the accident.
Interview with Professor-i 8UE, supra note 99. The student informed the court after the
verdict that she had not been permitted to recommend that the court acquit the defendant. Id.
The judge, reading between the lines, informed her that if she had actually been employed as
a prosecutor rather than as a student intern, she would have had the freedom to argue for an
acquittal. Id
396. Interview with Prosecutor- 13BR, supra note 113.
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amount of initiative that prosecutors demonstrate during the truth-finding
process may affect trial outcomes. Because judges control the trial process,
the impact of prosecutorial discretion at trial is severely bounded and is
mediated through the actions of the other players who participate in the
proceedings. Despite that limitation, prosecutors possess the potential to
function in the capacity of a "second judge" at trial. Whether they choose
to exercise that potential remains an open question.
Due to the fact that both prosecutors and judges receive the same legal
training and are typically members of the same social class, prosecutors
may be reluctant to challenge judges with whom they disagree. 9
Moreover, because prosecutors do not function as adversaries and do not
see a need to "win" a case, prosecutors have an incentive to yield to a
judge's perspective of a case. A potential for disagreement between a
prosecutor's view of a case and the judge's view exists. A prosecutor who
is intimately familiar with the evidence and may have personally directed
the course of the investigation may see the facts of the case differently than
a judge whose first impression of the case is the paper file. A judge who
has not previously worked as a prosecutor may have an unrealistic view of
the investigation resources at a prosecutor's disposal as well as the realities
of a prosecutor's caseload.
In addition, there is a potential for tension between the prosecutor
assigned to handle a case in court and the prosecutor who investigated the
case. Many prosecutors who handle cases at trial that were investigated by
another prosecutor will touch base with the investigation prosecutors to get
a sense of their ideal outcomes. In order to preserve collegial relations,
prosecutors who handle a case in court are typically reluctant to criticize the
investigation decisions made by another prosecutor. In the Strehien case,
this desire to preserve collegiality placed the trial prosecutor in a difficult
position. 3 It was clear that the investigating prosecutor had not conducted
a thorough investigation. 9 In fact, the trial prosecutor told me that one of
the reasons why there were problems with the case was that the
investigating prosecutor filed charges before she completed the
investigation. 0 When the defense attorneys raised issues about the case
397. See Interview with Appellate Judge-22FE, supra note 29 (stating that close
working and social relationships and similar backgrounds make it unlikely that prosecutors
and judges will oppose each other in the courtroom).
398. Interview with Prosecutor-8AR, supra note 117.
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during trial that the chief judge categorically dismissed, the trial prosecutor
was reluctant to challenge the judge or to critique the quality of the initial
investigation.U In the end, she elected not to side with the defense because
she was confident that the case would be overturned on appeal. 0
In the other two cases, Rosenberg and Schneekopf, the dance between
the prosecutor and the judge unfolded quite differently. 4 11 In Rosenberg,
the prosecutor's initial confrontation with the victim concerning her
drinking appeared to be a move towards an independent assessment of
objectivity.404 As the case progressed, the prosecutor and judge appeared to
work in tandem .40 5 In particular, the judge attempted to coax the "truth" out
of the victim, urging her to remember what happened. 0 The prosecutor
did not hang back and accept the lack of corroborating testimony in the
case. 407  He threatened the Turkish witness with a criminal charge and
worked to undermine the logic of the defendant's tetmoy
The interaction between the prosecutor and the chief judge in
Schneekopf was extremely interesting. The prosecutor did not hesitate to
tell the judge that he had concerns about the victim's credibility during a
break in the case .409  The judge seemed genuinely concerned that the
prosecutor might ask for an acquittal at the trial's conclusion .41 0 But for the
collateral prosecutor's efforts to negotiate a plea, it is possible that the
prosecutor and judge might have reached a different conclusion about the
evidence in the case. Critically, the source of this tension was not a
difference of opinion about the law that applied to the case. Instead the
difference of opinion emanated from a different perspective of the main
witness's credibility. In a legal system that privileges a positivistic vision
of the penal law, on a theoretical level there exists the possibility that a
judge and a prosecutor could reach a different conclusion about the facts in
40 1. Id
402. Id
403. See Part IV.B3 (describing the interactions between the prosecutor and judge in the
Rosenberg case ); Part IV.C (describing the interactions between the prosecutor and judge in
SchneekopJ).
404. Participant Observation-13 WT, supra note 13 5.
405. Id.
406. See id. ("You are here only as a witness. We just want to know what the truth
is.",).
407. Id
408. See id ("Stop playing with us and tells us what you know.... I can charge you
with a crime ... the failure to report a rape.").
409. Participant Observation-4MJ, supra note 23 1.
4 10. Id
357
35867 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1287 (2010)
a case. In that case, if the judge and the prosecutor strictly adhered to
criminal procedure, they might have voiced those differences in the
courtroom. For example, the prosecutor could move for an acquittal while
the judge leans to convict or the prosecutor could ask for a conviction,
while the judge elects to acquit. I would suggest, however, that the
common socialization of judges and prosecutors and their interdependence
in the courtroom would exert pressure on the parties to negotiate their
conflicting visions of truth. From a sociological perspective, it is worth
emphasizing that the public prosecutor and the judge likely studied the
same courses, may socialize together, and must continue to work with each
other on future cases. As one appellate judge stated:
Well, the public prosecutor and the judge twenty years ago studied the
same classes at the university. They know each other; in the afternoon
they play tennis together, why should the judge blame the public
prosecutor? They have to work together the next twenty years and if
one person started to bother the other, the other would bother the first
person, so you don't want to have any wall between these two
institutions. That's how it works in practical life. You will not find any
institutional changes. If you want institutional changes, you need a
radical turnaround of the legal system. 
4
11
The downside of the more active role that prosecutors in the United
States play is that they may become blinded to contradictory evidence and
prosecute a case too aggressively. The more passive role played by
German prosecutors possesses a downside as well. When prosecutors
narrowly interpret or abdicate their duty to participate in the truth-finding
process, they forfeit the opportunity to enhance the objectivity of the fact-
finding process. While German criminal procedure law does not aim to
establish a truth-finding process in which the truth is produced from a battle
between adversaries, the system requires prosecutors to fulfill an
independent fact-finding role.41 Although the law posits that the judge and
prosecutor will function independently while viewing the evidence through
an objective lens, this Article demonstrates that objectivity is the end
product of a constitutive process in which the nature of the relationship
between the prosecutors and judges as well as the temporal relationship
between the trial and investigating prosecutors give birth to the face of
objectivity. In sum, where prosecutors are content to play a passive role in
the truth-finding process, that passivity may not satisfy the duty of
411. Interview with Appellate Judge-22FE, supra note 29.
412. See STPO, supra note 7, § 160(2) (mandating that prosecutors ascertain both
incriminating and exonerating evidence).
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objectivity. Consequently, in some situations Germany's two-judge system
does not create a level of redundancy that enhances the accuracy of the
decision-making process at trial. In cases in which a prosecutor possesses a
more robust self-image, the prosecutor plays a critical role in the courtroom
truth-finding process.

